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Abstract  
 
This dissertation examines the corn based ethanol industry in the Corn Belt of the U.S. from 
three different angles: What affects ethanol plant location decisions, how does new ethanol 
capacity affect the local corn price, and what is the future landscape of ethanol production under 
an uncertain future? Ethanol production is a significant part of the American economy in terms of 
market demand for corn, job creation, household income, tax revenue, and decreasing reliance on 
foreign fuel. The EPA has supported the ethanol industry through the creation of the Renewable 
Fuels Standards put in place in 2007, however the very mandate created in part to secure the future 
of renewable energy in the U.S. is also a source of uncertainty. In late 2015, after speculation of a 
reduction in the requirement for ethanol, the RFS were renewed at an increased ethanol mandate 
than expected. These three papers enhance general understanding of how ethanol growth may 
occur, how new ethanol capacity affects local corn price in the more mature ethanol industry, and 
gives an idea of where future ethanol capacity will locate, if demand increases, or which currently 
producing locations are most vulnerable to a loss, if demand falls. This dissertation is the first 
study to account for the simultaneity between ethanol plant location decisions and corn prices in 
estimating the effect of new ethanol capacity on local corn price. All three papers contribute to the 
literature by including the spatial effects of surrounding counties and utilize information from the 
mature ethanol industry post-2008.  
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1. Introduction 
Ethanol demand has increased over 166% between 2006 and 2014. Ethanol production has 
gone from 3.9 billion gallons in 2005 to about 14.3 billion gallons in 2014, which requires roughly 
5.7 billion bushels of corn to produce (USDA-ERS 2015; RFA 2015). Corn prices rose from under 
$2.00 per bushel in 2005 to about $5.50 per bushel in 2008 before settling back down to under 
$4.00 per bushel in 2010, which Babcock and Fabiosa (2011) and Fortenbery and Park (2008) 
argue can at least partially be attributed to the increased demand from the ethanol industry (USDA-
NASS 2010). The rapid expansion in the ethanol industry is largely attributed to the 2007 
Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) which originally mandated that 15 billion gallons per year of 
ethanol be produced by 2022. In May, 2015 the EPA proposed new mandates levels of 13.25, 
13.40 and 14.00 billion gallons of ethanol per year for 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively be used 
in blending with gasoline (EPA 2015a). This reduction worried ethanol producers, as the rate of 
ethanol production in 2014 was already at 14.3 billion gallons, greater than the proposed 2016 
mandated level (RFA 2015). In late November, 2015 the EPA published the final revised mandate 
levels of 18.11 billion gallons of total renewable fuels by 2016, with an implied corn ethanol level 
of 14.5 billion gallons of ethanol (EPA 2015b).   
In this set of papers, I explore what factors determine ethanol plant location decisions and 
the effect of those location choices, I estimate the effect an increase in ethanol capacity has on 
local corn basis and I estimate what the future landscape of ethanol production might look like 
under uncertain future demand. All three papers share a similar geographic scope: 19 states across 
the Corn Belt. The spatial nature of my data allows me to account for spatial dependencies in all 
 2 
 
three chapters. My data also allow me to include ethanol plant information from a more mature 
ethanol industry than has been studied in the past.  
In the first chapter I examine location decisions during the rapidly growing ethanol industry 
in 2007 and 2008, as well as a more mature industry in 2009 and 2010. I use county level panel 
data, including demographic, economic and cost variables measured annually between 2005 and 
2010 that are likely to affect ethanol plant location decisions to estimate the probability of ethanol 
plants locating in a county using a probit model with spatial and temporal lags of the independent 
variables.  
In the second chapter, I estimate the effect of ethanol plants on local basis. My data 
encompass not only the maturing ethanol market, but also the record-high grain prices in 2007/08.  
This means I am able to consider the effect of ethanol plants on local basis when market demand 
is relatively slack early in the period, and tight later in the period. I use a two-step spatial model to 
estimate the effect of new ethanol plant capacity on local corn basis using monthly county level 
data from December 2005 through September 2010.  Basis is measured as the difference between 
local cash price and near-by futures price. Previous literature exploring the effect of ethanol plants 
on local price or basis does not account for the endogeneity between the location decision and 
local prices, (see McNew and Griffeth (2005), Lewis (2010) and O’Brien (2009)). To address this 
endogeneity, I first estimate the site and capacity choice of ethanol plants using instrumental 
variables, and then use those estimates to determine how ethanol plants affect local corn basis and 
how this effect is distributed through space. As ethanol production fluctuates in response to policy 
changes, the demand for corn – and the price received by farmers – fluctuates as well. 
Understanding how changing mandates in the ethanol industry affect local corn prices can inform 
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decisions faced by farmers and investors in the corn industry, the largest US agricultural industry 
in terms of both harvested acreage and cash receipts. 
In the third chapter, I use county level data from 2010 in a Conditionally Parametric (CPAR) 
locally weighted spatial logit model to determine which non-ethanol producing counties are most 
likely to host a new ethanol plant, and which currently producing counties are most vulnerable to 
an ethanol plant going idle. To my knowledge, this is the first research of its kind. Previous 
research on what affects ethanol plant location or idling decisions has focused on what affects 
location choice and revenue margins (Schmit, Luo and Tauer 2009; Gonzalez 2011; Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson 1989; Sesmero, Perrin and Fulginiti 2012; Tiffany and Eidman 2003). I 
extend the literature by first expanding the analysis to predict where new plants will locate given 
expansionary pressures, as well as identifying which ethanol producing counties are most 
vulnerable to a loss in ethanol production, given a potential contraction in demand. Through the 
use of locally weighted regression, I allow the effect of each input to vary over space. 
Ethanol production has been shown to create jobs, increase tax revenues, increase household 
income, reduce imports of crude oil and reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared to what would 
have been seen under gasoline use (Blanco and Isenhouer 2010; Ethanol Across America 2006; 
Dalesio 2012; Hofstrand 2012; Anon 2015). As ethanol production hits the “blend wall” and the 
level implied by the EPA mandated, local decision makers have to understand what factors attract 
ethanol production in order to keep existing production or induce a new facility to locate in their 
neighborhood. If a local area lacks one incentive, lower corn production levels than a neighboring 
county for example, they may make up for it by lowering the tax burden or improving 
infrastructure. Knowing what influences ethanol plant location decisions when ethanol regulation 
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is relatively uncertain can aid decision makers hoping to attract ethanol producers shape policies 
to increase their attractiveness for ethanol plants. 
With the uncertainty surrounding the RFS, level of export demand, production of alternative 
renewable fuels and the ability of the U.S. economy to push past the E-10 blend wall, the future of 
the ethanol industry is not clear cut. Given the importance of the U.S. corn industry and its interest 
in ethanol, as well as the touted benefits of domestic ethanol production, understanding the 
direction future gains or losses to the ethanol industry may take is valuable, not only to the corn 
industry, but to municipal leaders, policy makers and other interested parties. 
Taken together, these three chapters have the potential to expand the knowledge base around 
how local economies can control changes in the ethanol industry in their area, starting from how 
to attract or increase ethanol capacity, to understanding what changing ethanol capacity means for 
local farmers, to having an idea of how production in the area may be affected in the future.  
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2. Spatial and Temporal Effects of Ethanol Plant Location Decisions in the 
U.S. Corn Belt, 2005 Through 2010 
 
Collaborators: Mindy Mallory and Kathy Baylis 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This study examines the factors that affect ethanol plant location in a maturing ethanol market. 
I use a probit regression with spatial and temporal lags to model the probability of ethanol being 
produced in a Corn Belt county. Local decision makers interested in attracting new ethanol 
capacity to their area have to understand what factors attract ethanol production. I identify which 
demographic, economic and cost variables are most important to ethanol producers, accounting 
for both spatial and temporal effects. I find that competition from competing ethanol plants is a 
more significant factor in areas with dense ethanol production and that the negative affect of spatial 
competition is exacerbated by high levels of corn production compared to areas with low levels. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Between 1998 and 2008, ethanol demand in the U.S. increased over 400% (USDA-ERS 
2011), and ethanol is now produced in 29 states. Ethanol production increased from 3.6 billion 
gallons in 2005 to 14.3 billion gallons in 2014, close to the original mandate of 15 billion gallons 
of ethanol blended into gasoline by 2022 set in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007  
(RFA 2015). In May of 2015, the EPA proposed a revised standard that would reduce the implied 
ethanol mandate to 14 billion gallons of ethanol per year blended into gasoline by 2016, less than 
the 2014 level of production in the U.S. (EPA 2015a). In November, 2015 the EPA announced the 
final ruling for the RFS volume requirement which reflect an implied corn ethanol mandate of 14.5 
billion gallons (EPA 2015b). Corn based ethanol production is greater than the level required to 
satisfy the proposed mandate, fairly close to the finalized mandate, ethanol production is rapidly 
hitting the bland wall and future gasoline demand is uncertain, which all combines to cause future 
investment in the corn based ethanol industry to be uncertain. In the 19 states included in this 
research, no new plants were built in 2010, and the total capacity of new plants in 2009 is lower 
than the two previous years.  
Research by Blanco and Isenhouer (2010), Ethanol Across America (2006), and Dalesio 
(2012) and others indicate that new ethanol plants create jobs and increase tax revenues. The U.S. 
Department of Energy credits ethanol production in the U.S. with reducing imports of crude oil by 
8% in 2013 compared to what imports would have been without domestic ethanol production, as 
well as with reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 52% compared to gasoline production and use 
on a life cycle analysis basis (Anon 2015). In this mature market it is important to know what 
factors influence ethanol plant location decisions to better understand the industry in this settling 
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down phase, which can aid decision makers hoping to attract ethanol producers shape policies to 
increase their attractiveness to ethanol plants.  
In this research, I use a probit regression with spatial and temporal lags to model the 
probability of ethanol being produced in a Corn Belt county. Though some past studies on ethanol 
plant locations, for example Lambert et al. (2008) and Sarmiento and Wilson (2008), use spatial 
information, most of them only consider a spatial cross section of the industry and do not include 
temporal aspects such as changing input costs, labor availability or other county level demographic 
variables over time. This current analysis identifies which demographic, economic and cost 
variables are most important to producers. It also serves to show how both space and time matter 
in these decisions in a mature ethanol market.   
I find that competition from surrounding ethanol plants is more significant in determining 
the location of ethanol plants in regions with denser ethanol production. The deterrent effect of 
spatial competition is larger in the Plains than the Great Lakes region. I also find that the deterrent 
effect of spatial competition is stronger for private ethanol plants than farmer owned plants. In 
addition, high levels of corn production seem to exacerbate the negative affect of spatial 
competition for both the Plains region and private ethanol plants more than for the Great Lakes 
region and farmer owned ethanol plants. 
Many previous studies only look at why plants located where they did without including 
changing temporal information. I use a panel data set to incorporate changing market and economic 
conditions over time. For example, transportation costs, unemployment rates and median income 
have changed between 2005 and 2010, which will affect both plant location as well as the timing 
of a plant opening. Though some studies include the effect of other plants operating in the regions, 
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they all used inverse distance weights between plants. In this paper, I model competing ethanol 
plants as the spatial weight of the number of ethanol plants in the surrounding counites. 
Figure 2.1 shows ethanol plant locations and corn yields across the U.S. in 2007 (Wade 
2009). This figure indicates that ethanol plants tend to locate where corn production is high. As 
with most production facilities, ethanol plants prefer a large, steady supply of feed stock with low 
transportation costs. This observation is supported by Lambert et al. (2008) and Sarmiento and 
Wilson (2008),who present research that ethanol plant owners choose locations based on corn 
prices, corn production, and other cost factors.  
Previous research has been unable to include information from the more mature ethanol 
market that has emerged since 2008. In the regions included in this research, the rate of new ethanol 
capacity being built fell between 2008 and 2009, and in 2010 there was no new capacity built. This 
may be because the pressure to increase ethanol production eased as total ethanol production 
neared the previous 15 billion gallons per year by 2022 mandate put forth by the EPA in 2007. 
The mandate was revised near the end of 2015, reducing the implied mandated level of ethanol 
production to 14.5, billion gallons per year for 2016, only about 200 million gallons higher than 
the reported level of ethanol production for 2014 (EPA 2015b; RFA 2015). 
Urbanchuk (2015) reports that ethanol production not only creates jobs directly related to the 
ethanol plant, but induces job creation in other areas, including construction, agriculture and 
research and development. Local economies improved through higher tax revenue and increased 
spending as a result of these jobs may be worried about the future of ethanol production in their 
area. As ethanol production hits the “blend wall” and the EPA mandate, local decision makers 
have to understand what factors attract ethanol production in order to keep existing production or 
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induce a new facility to locate in their neighborhood. If the local area lacks one incentive, perhaps 
lower corn production levels than a neighboring county, they may make up for it, for example, by 
lowering the tax burden or improving infrastructure. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Schmenner, Huber and Cook (1987) explore state choice locations of new major firms, 
mostly Fortune 500 companies, opening between 1970 and 1980 by modeling a two stage decision 
process. They use separate multinomial logit regressions for the two stages, with the first stage 
results predicting a subset of state choices for each firm. The final choice of state location in the 
second stage is restricted to the subset predicted from the first stage. The data used come from a 
survey of plant managers in new facilities which asked about plant facilities, reasons for locating 
where they did, as well as which states, other than that of their final location, were seriously 
considered. Though the two stage idea is a valid one and may increase accuracy of how specific 
factors influence final choice, using only one stage gives a broader idea of what influences location 
choice for the industry as a whole.  
Haddad, Taylor and Owusu (2010) focus on identifying what influences ethanol plant county 
choices in four states in the Mid-West: Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota and Nebraska. Like Schmenner, 
Huber and Cook (1987), they recognize that plants choose a general location first, and then pick a 
specific site within that chosen region. The authors first estimate a single probit choice model 
including all four states, and then compare it to regressions run on each state individually to 
determine the difference between what drives choosing a region to locate in, versus what drives 
the more specific location choice decisions made after a general area is chosen. Corn availability, 
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measured as the total bushels of corn produced in each county, is the only significant variable 
when the data are run as one group, however when states are ran individually, Iowa and Illinois no 
longer have corn as a significant variable, though Minnesota and Nebraska still do. In the Iowa 
regression, the significant variables include railroad lines, land values and population density. In 
Minnesota, in addition to corn availability, the amount of cattle and population density are 
significant. In Nebraska, only corn availability is significant and in Illinois, natural gas pipelines 
and blender locations are important. This difference across states is attributed to the variability of 
the inherent characteristics of the states; for example, in the two states where corn is an 
insignificant factor in determining plant location, corn is produced at a fairly high rate across the 
state. In other states, there are few blender locations, or land values or the concentration of 
livestock change considerably over the state.  
A limitation of this study is that the authors do not take into account the interactions of space 
around each plant; for example they do not take into account the existing plants in the area. In the 
states studied, there are likely different concentrations of existing ethanol production, which is 
bound to have an influence on the location choice of new plants. To get around this problem, 
Haddad, Taylor and Owusu (2010) assume, because their data comes from pre-2007, the ethanol 
industry is still fairly small and competition is not a strong factor in location choice. Also, the 
authors do not allow the location characteristics to change based on when each plant in their data 
set opened. For example, the level of corn production or land values may have been at one level 
in 2001, but somewhere different in 2007. 
Sarmiento and Wilson (2008) analyze spatial competition of ethanol plants using spatial 
autocorrelation techniques and a discrete choice model. The authors include not only production 
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of corn, but also production of other grains, acres of corn and other grains planted, crop production 
risk, head of cattle and hogs, and state subsidy levels. Their data include county level information 
across the contiguous 48 states and plant openings between 2000 and 2007, however they also do 
not include time as a factor in their estimation. The independent variables are measured at a single 
point in time. They model spatial competition as the sum of the inverse distance between plants. 
They include spatially lagged values of acreage planted to corn as well as other crops, also an 
inverse function of distance.  
Lambert et al. (2008) analyze plant location choices across the U.S. between 2000 and 2007 
using a probit regression. The location determinants are fixed over time and are all measured at 
their 2000 or pre-2000 level. The variables used include corn availability in the county, corn 
availability in the surrounding region, per capita income, waterway and railway availability, access 
to utilities, demand for both ethanol (through gas stations in the area) and DDGs (through a 
measure of cattle and hogs in the area), other industry competition for corn (warehouses and 
storage locations for agricultural products), the number of ethanol plants before 2000, labor 
determinants (education, diversification and wage levels), county property taxes and state 
incentives. The differing effects of whether or not the county is located in a metro- or 
nonmetropolitan area are separated out by interacting dummy variables with the independent 
variables mentioned above. They use a row standardized first order contiguity matrix to include 
the levels of corn and gas stations in the surrounding areas.  
The authors find that metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have differing effects with 
nonmetropolitan counties having a comparative advantage over metropolitan counties, higher 
income leads to less investment, and access to corn is significant both from within the county and 
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from the surrounding areas. Final demand markets for both ethanol and DDGs are significant, as 
is competition from storage or warehousing. Most labor determinants are insignificant, with the 
exception of wages which has a negative correlation. Navigable waterways and railroad miles are 
significant, but access to utilities was insignificant. Local tax burden, tax exemptions and credit 
incentives are also significant, as was the banning of Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), an 
additive in gasoline1. They find high probabilities of plants locating in southern California, the 
Oklahoma and Texas panhandles, Eastern Illinois, Eastern Colorado, Southeast South Dakota and 
Western Nebraska as well as Central Michigan and Northeast Ohio.  
These studies determine what influences ethanol plant locations, however they do not 
account for competition from ethanol plants located in the same region. Also, the literature has not 
included information from the more mature ethanol industry post-2007. The research I am 
presenting here is an initial attempt to fill those gaps. I allow influencing variables to change over 
time, I include data through 2010, a more mature ethanol market and I include the strength of 
spatial competition in the ethanol industry through including the spatial weight of the number of 
ethanol plants in the surrounding counties. 
 
2.3 Method 
In this chapter, I examine what affects the decision of whether an ethanol plant will locate in 
a given county or not. Similar to previous research, I model ethanol plant location using a binary 
response function in order to estimate the probability of an ethanol plant locating in county i in 
                                                 
1 The ban on MTBE is not considered in this paper because all data comes from after January 2005 and the deadline 
for the phase out of MTBE as a gasoline additive is 2006. Also, 12 of the 19 states in the study had legislation in 
place banning MTBE by the end of 2004. 
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time t given a set of independent variables. The probit and logit functions are the most common 
binary response models used to determine the probability of a dependent variable happening (or 
not), and often return very similar results. In fact, I find the results from probit and logit methods 
in this chapter lead to very equivalent marginal results.  
I model ethanol plant location decisions with a combined probit and spatial lag model. The 
probit model is used to estimate the probability of an ethanol plant producing in a county. The 
spatial lag is used in order to account for spatial spillovers between counties. Though a plant may 
locate in one county, its impact on nearby corn and ethanol markets are likely to spill over into 
neighboring counties, because plants may purchase corn from another county, sell DDGs to 
livestock producers in other counties, or attract workers from other counties, etc.  
Ethanol Across America published a report in 2006 that indicates that as technology 
improved over time, economies of scale in ethanol production became more available and plants 
grew larger, both through new, higher capacity plants as well as through increasing the capacity 
of existing plants (Ethanol Across America 2006). Figure 2.2 shows the frequency distribution of 
new ethanol plant capacities separated by year. This figure indicates that in general, the capacity 
of new plants seems to have increased every year. Table 2.1 contains the p-values from t-tests of 
the comparisons of the means of new capacity from the data. The results indicate that mean 
capacity is increasing through time. For these reasons, I consider plant capacity as a deterministic 
function of time and I focus on location choice and include time dummy variables. 
The probit model is a special case of the general binary response model, 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝒙𝜷).  (Eq. 2.1) 
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This model estimates the probability that a dependent variable, y, is equal to one given the 
independent variables x. In the probit model,  
𝐺(𝑧) = Φ(z) = ∫ 𝜙(𝑣)d𝑣
𝑧
−∞
 
and 𝜙(𝑧) is the standard normal density (Wooldridge 2010).  
In my model, the dependent variable 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 was coded as a one for each county i and time 
t combination in which there was a positive level of capacity, and coded a zero otherwise. 
Therefore, the general model I estimate is 
P(𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝒙𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐺(𝒙𝜶), 
and 
𝒙𝜶 = 𝛼0 + 𝜶
𝒙𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜹 ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑿𝒋,𝒕) + 𝜶
𝒚𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜶
𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 are the exogenous variables, ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1  are the spatial weights matrices of order k , 𝑿𝒋,𝒕 
are the spatial exogenous variables, 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 are the year fixed effects, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 are the state fixed 
effects, 𝜶𝒙, 𝜶𝒚, 𝜶𝒔 are the coefficients on 𝑿𝒊,𝒕,  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕, and 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 and 𝜹 are the coefficients on the 
spatial lag variables. 
Temporal variables are all lagged one period. This is to better take into account the time it 
takes from making decisions (where to locate new capacity) to the beginning of new ethanol 
production as well as to reduce contemporaneous simultaneity. 
 
 
 
(Eq. 2.2) 
(Eq. 2.3) 
(Eq. 2.4) 
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2.4 Data 
The data used in this chapter spans 2005 through 2010 and includes county level information 
across the Corn Belt. There are 19 states included in the data set: Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. This research uses 
a probit choice model, and the dependent variable (𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡), was created by coding a “1” for every 
county that had a maximum total ethanol capacity greater than zero in time t and a “0” otherwise. 
This was done for each county for each year.  
The proportions of positive ethanol capacity (those coded as “1”) to total observations can 
be seen in Figure 2.3. In the full data set, just over 8% of observations contain ethanol capacity. 
When the data is reduced to the top ten ethanol producing states, the proportion jumps to over 
13%. In Iowa, the largest ethanol producer, almost 29% of the total observations contain ethanol 
capacity. Regionally, the Great lakes contain about 6.6% ethanol capacity and the Plains contain 
about 15%. When examining results regionally, I do not include the Rocky Mountain, Southeast 
and Southwest regions because they contain just over 4%, less than 1% and zero total observations 
with ethanol capacity, respectively.  
The proportions change over time as well. This can be seen in Figure 2.3. Iowa experiences 
a sharper increase in ethanol observations over time than the other geographic groups shown, 
however all groups have the same general progression. Between 2005 and 2008/2009, the 
proportions of ethanol capacity observations increase in all classifications. Between 2009 and 
2010, proportions either decrease or remain even. I explore differences in results due to the 
proportion of existing ethanol capacity across groups in later specifications. 
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I include a one period lagged dummy variable indicating the presence of ethanol capacity in 
the previous year (𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1), coded as one for each county i and time t combination in which 
there was a positive level of capacity, and coded a zero otherwise. This allows me to measure how 
much of a factor ethanol capacity in the previous year was in determining if ethanol is produced 
in time t. There are very few instances where ethanol capacity changed from positive to zero, so 
pre-existing ethanol capacity should be a strong indicator of contemporaneous ethanol capacity.  
Ethanol plant information comes from the Renewable Fuels Association, Ethanol Producer 
Magazine, the American Coalition for Ethanol, and press releases about plant openings. Seventeen 
states contain ethanol plants; the two that do not are Arkansas and Oklahoma. Of the remaining 
states, 79 counties contain ethanol plants in 2005 and 163 counties contain plants in 2010. Of those 
counties, four contain two ethanol plants in 2005 and 12 contain two ethanol plants in 2010, for a 
total of 83 ethanol plants in 2005 and 175 ethanol plants in 2010. An increase in ethanol capacity 
is experienced in 185 counties, while 19 counties experience a decrease. The state with the largest 
increase in number of ethanol plants and total ethanol capacity is Iowa. The majority of ethanol 
plants built between 2005 and 2010 were completed in 2008. These statistics for each state, as well 
as information about plant capacity by state can be seen in Table 2.2.  
In the full regression, I include three orders of spatial lags of the number of ethanol plants 
(∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 , ∑ 𝑊𝑖
2𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1, and ∑ 𝑊𝑖
3𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1). The spatial weights for 
the lags (𝑊𝑖,𝑊𝑖
2, and 𝑊𝑖
3) are calculated using a Queen’s contiguity matrix. For more information 
on contiguity matrices, see Anselin and Bruton Center (1999). 𝑊𝑖 is a queen’s contiguity weights 
matrix for county i with a positive weight given to all counties directly surrounding county i, and 
a weight of zero given to all other counties. 𝑊𝑖
2 is a second order queen’s contiguity matrix with 
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a positive weight given to all counties in the second order of contiguity from county i and a weight 
of zero given to all other counties (see Figure 2.4). 𝑊𝑖
3 is a third contiguity matrix with a positive 
weight given to all counties in the third contiguity from county i, and a weight of zero given to all 
other counties.  
The Queen’s contiguity weights matrices are determined by whether or not the counties share 
a border, and are calculated separately for each county i. For each county, the number of ethanol 
plants are multiplied by the weight given to that county i – county j relationship, and then added 
together. This is done separately for the first order (those counties directly surrounding the county 
of interest), the second order (those counties in the second “ring” surrounding the county of 
interest) and the third order (those counties in the third “ring” surrounding the county of interest) 
of contiguities. The results connected to these variables give an idea of how much surrounding 
ethanol plants affect the decision to locate in the county of interest. This method allows the 
competition for inputs from other ethanol plants to be a factor in location choice. 
A study from Iowa indicates that ethanol plants are very conscience of the push-pull from 
livestock producers in choice of location (Hardy et al. 2006). It also shows that though ethanol 
plants compete with corn elevators, the effect of local competition is muddied by some competitors 
working with ethanol plants to increase the storage capacity of the plants due to ethanol plants 
often not being able to store enough corn on site to continue running the entire year.  Ethanol plants 
must purchase corn from those competing elevators, or even have storage contracts with them or 
the local farmers. This may mitigate the effect of competition for corn from the industries that 
allow for large capacity corn storage, for example shuttle loaders - elevators with the ability to 
load high capacity shuttle trains with grain. 
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Ethanol plants also compete with other corn processors for local corn. I do not explicitly 
account for competition from other corn demanding industries, with the exception of livestock, 
however some of the competition is accounted for through the annual and state fixed effects I 
include. The underlying differences that affect state level choices of corn processors is accounted 
for in the state fixed effects. For example, some states are historically more attractive to corn 
processors due to corn production levels, transportation network availability or location of 
purchasers of their outputs Also, research has shown that corn processed for food increased or 
remained steady between 2000 and 2009, indicating that corn processing for food and corn 
processing for ethanol are not strong competitors (Wallander, Claassen and Nickerson 2011). 
Though biodiesel is a direct competitor to ethanol plants, I do not account for their locations or 
capacity. The inclusion of biodiesel could improve the results, however there are comparatively 
few plants according to the Energy Information Administration, soybean oil is the largest feedstock 
to the biodiesel industry (EIA 2016).  
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 represent the relationship between co-op and private ethanol 
capacities by state for 2005 and 2010, respectively and Figure 2.7 shows the change in ethanol 
capacity. Clearly, different locations are correlated with higher levels of co-op ownership (𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1), 
and this location based association seems to change over time. In 2005, just over 36% of total 
capacity in my sample is farmer owned. This falls slightly, to just under 33% of total capacity in 
2010. In 2005, Minnesota had the highest level of farmer owned capacity with Iowa and South 
Dakota close behind, and all ethanol capacity in Missouri was farmer owned. In 2010, the level of 
farmer owned capacity increased in most states, with the largest increase happening in Iowa and 
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South Dakota, both of which surpassed Minnesota. Missouri’s rate of famer owned ethanol 
capacity fell from 100% to under 50%.2  
Corn is the main input in ethanol production in the U.S., so I include corn production 
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) for each county, which comes from USDA-NASS. It is measured as the average 
annual production of the county in millions of bushels. There is a wide range of corn production 
over the counties in my data set. The 50th percentile starts at about 2.7 million, the 75th percentile 
starts at about 11 million bushels, the 95th starts at about 30 million bushels, and the mean is about 
7.5 million bushels. Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the level of corn production for the states in 
my data set in 2005 and 2010. Corn production is not the only characteristic ethanol producers are 
interested in; otherwise the order of the top ten ethanol producing states would fall in line with the 
top ten corn producing states. Though there is overlap in the top ten status for most of the states, 
their order in the ranks differ. 
Ethanol plants do not constrain input acquisition to within county borders; therefore I include 
one spatial lag of corn production as well (∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1). Like the spatial lag of 
ethanol capacity, the spatial lag of corn production is used to reflect the characteristics of the 
general region. Further spatial lags of corn production were tested and found to be insignificant. 
I also include county demographics and ethanol production cost factors that previous 
research has reported as affecting ethanol production from previous ethanol plant location 
                                                 
2 Six counties have both a co-op and a private plant: in South Dakota (2), Iowa (2), Nebraska (1) and Wisconsin 
(1). In South Dakota, the proportion of farmer owned capacity in both counties increased compared to total capacity. 
In Iowa the proportion of farmer owned capacity increased in one county while the other stayed constant. In Nebraska 
the proportion of farmer owned capacity stayed constant. In Wisconsin the proportion of farmer owned capacity fell 
meaning a private plant opened in the county. 
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(Sarmiento and Wilson 2008; Lambert et al. 2008). The variables I include are population density 
(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1), unemployment rate (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1), median income (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), price of 
natural gas (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1), and the net flow of natural gas in the state (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑡−1). Annual 
population density is measured as people per square mile in each county and is used as a measure 
of the rural or urban nature of each county. Annual unemployment rate for each county is measured 
in percentage points and is included as an indicator of rural vs. urban locations, as well as a measure 
of available work force in the area. Annual county level median income is measured in thousand 
dollars and is included as an input cost, specifically as indicator of labor costs in the county.  
Many ethanol plants use natural gas in their production process, so I include annual county 
level natural gas price measured in dollars per thousand cubic feet. I include the availability of 
natural gas through the flow of natural gas measured annually at the state level in million cubic 
feet per day. I attempted to measure the availability of natural gas in each county using the density 
of natural gas pipelines, however the data proved to be difficult to obtain.  
I also include measures of livestock (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑖, 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑖, ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑖 , 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑖). The livestock measures 
capture both competition for corn as well as an incentive for ethanol location through demand for 
distiller’s grains, which are a feed additive in the livestock industry. Locating close to livestock 
producers willing to purchase milled wet distiller’s grains (MWDGs) means plants do not have to 
incur the cost to dry the distiller’s grain. Even if ethanol plants dry the grains, making dry distiller’s 
grain (DDGs), locating near livestock producers reduces the cost of shipping this byproduct 
compared to if the plants are further from the livestock. I include dairy cattle, beef cattle, hogs and 
chickens separately because they consume distiller’s grains and corn at different rates. Livestock 
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is measured as thousands of heads of livestock at the county level, and comes from the 2002 survey 
of agriculture (USDA-NASS 2004).  
Ethanol and corn are often moved by rail and, as can be seen in Figure 2.8, ethanol plants 
locate on or near rail lines. I include density of rail lines (𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖), in each county as a proxy for 
transportation availability. I only have the 2010 data on density of rail, so this measure is constant 
over time. I also visually assessed the location of ethanol plants in relation to major roads and 
waterways, finding both to be seemingly unrelated, though the relationship would likely change if 
I included minor roads and waterways. 
County level annual average local tax burden (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡−1) is included as an additional county 
level production cost and is measured in percentage points. This variable represents county level 
incentives ethanol plant owners may be attracted to. An ethanol plant located in a county with a 
small tax burden realizes lower total costs than if the tax burden is high. 
I also include year fixed effects (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) and two versions of locational fixed effects, states 
(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) and regions (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖). I determined regions based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
regions, seen in Table 2.3. Rocky Mountain consists of Wyoming and Colorado; Plains includes 
North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri and Minnesota; Great Lakes includes 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio; Southwest includes Oklahoma; and Southeast 
includes Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas and Mississippi. In exploring separate regions, I single 
out the Great Lakes and the Plains regions due to their overwhelming proportion of ethanol 
capacity compared to the other three regions combined. This can be seen in Table 2.3 and Figure 
2.9. 
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2.5 Results 
Direction and significance of results are consistent throughout the specifications. Table 2.4 
contains the direction and significance of the panel type probit regression. The direction of the 
coefficients on all independent variables are robust to model choice, though only the existence of 
ethanol capacity, the first spatial lag of the number of ethanol plants and corn production within 
the county are significant in the Full Regression. Therefore, to analyze results further, I use a 
Parsimonious model including only the significant variables from the Full Regression, as well as 
the spatial lag of corn production.  
The significance of the spatial lag of the number of ethanol plants, ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1, 
varies across specifications, however where it is significant, the result is negative. Ethanol plants 
in the surrounding counties, an indication of competition, decrease the probability of ethanol 
capacity in the county of interest. Higher levels of corn production in the county of interest, 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1, are associated with increases in the probability of ethanol capacity, usually at 
the 0.1% level. In the spatial lag of corn production, ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1, though the result 
is always positive it is only significant in the Parsimonious and the Coop Dummy models. The 
existence of capacity within the county of interest in the previous year, 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1, is significant at 
the 0.1% level and positive across all model specifications. This indicates that positive ethanol 
capacity in the previous year is a strong indicator of contemporaneous ethanol capacity. This 
changes when I examine the probability of a new plant or new capacity opening in a county. 
Existing ethanol capacity reduces the likelihood of a new plant opening in a county, and only 
slightly increases the probability of any new capacity coming online in the county. 
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I use the average marginal effects in order to discuss the magnitude of the regression results3. 
Results indicate that corn production is the largest factor affecting ethanol capacity location, 
though this changes slightly based on region and ownership. In the Parsimonious model, one 
million bushels of corn in an average county is associated with an almost 8% increase in the 
probability of ethanol capacity existing in the county. One million bushels in a surrounding county 
is association with a marginal effect of 1.3%. The marginal effect of an ethanol plant in the 
surrounding counties is associated with a decrease of 0.4% in the probability of ethanol capacity 
in the county of interest.  
My results also suggest that ethanol plants in the Plains region are more deterred by 
competition from other ethanol plants than those in the Great Lakes region. The marginal effect in 
the Great Lakes region is smaller than in the Plains region, as well as insignificant. The location 
of competing ethanol plants is also more of a deterrent to private plants than farmer owned plants 
with the coefficient on surrounding ethanol plants being closer to zero for coop plants, as well as 
insignificant.  
I find that corn production is, by far, the most important input in determining where new 
ethanol capacity or new plants locate with the marginal effect of 1 million bushels of corn 
associated with an increase in probability of ethanol capacity of 9.6% and 11.3%, respectively. 
The probability of new ethanol capacity is also negatively associated with existing ethanol 
capacity. An existing ethanol plant decreases the probability of a new ethanol plant locating in the 
county by 1.5%. 
                                                 
3 Due to issues with calculating the marginal effects of the panel type probit regressions, the reported marginal 
effects are from a probit model. The regression results for the two methods are similar, however, indicating that their 
marginal effects are as well. 
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The average marginal effects for the Parsimonious model can be seen in Table 2.5. A graph 
of the marginal effects over varying levels of corn production, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1, can be seen in 
Figure 2.10. In the Parsimonious model, the marginal effect of increasing corn production at the 
mean of 7.5 million bushels of corn is associated with a probability of ethanol capacity of about 
7.9%. When the marginal effect of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is examined over varying levels of corn 
production, I find that the effect of corn production slowly increases until about 15 million bushels 
of corn are produced, after which the rate of increase in the marginal effect of corn production 
increases sharply with higher levels of corn production, as can be seen in Figure 2.10. This 
indicates that in counties with low levels of corn production, increasing corn production a small 
amount has a minimal effect on whether or not ethanol capacity will locate in that county. 
However, starting at about 15 million bushels of corn production, every new bushel increases the 
likelihood of ethanol capacity at an increasing rate.  
The spatial lag of corn production in the previous year 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is associated with a 
marginal effect of about 1.3% at the mean. Similar to within county corn production, at about 15 
million bushels, the marginal effect increases with higher levels of corn production. The 
probability of an ethanol plant in a county, given that county produced 30 million bushels of corn 
last year, and all other variables at their mean level, is about 3.4%. The true association is likely 
higher, however, as the difference in the rate of corn production in geographically close counties 
is probably more similar than 30 million bushels in the county of interest and somewhere between 
7 and 8 million bushels in a surrounding county. 
An ethanol plant in the first spatial lag in the previous year ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 decreases 
the probability of within county capacity by 0.4% compared to a county with no ethanol capacity 
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in the first spatial lag. Again, at about 15 million bushels of corn production, the rate of change in 
the marginal effect of the spatial lag of the number of plants increases. At 15 million bushels, the 
marginal effect of a plant in the surrounding counties is about -0.46%, by 30 million bushels, the 
marginal effect more than doubles to -0.94%. In general, as more corn is produced, the marginal 
effect of an ethanol plant in the surrounding areas gets stronger and it is slightly less likely an 
ethanol plant will produce in the county of interest. The effect of competition increases as the 
amount of corn produced increases. I expected to see a competition having a greater effect when 
less corn is available. This counterintuitive result may be because ethanol plants in counties with 
low levels of corn production likely import a lot of corn already so the effect of the competition 
locating nearby is averaged over a larger area. In counties producing a lot of corn, the available 
corn is “fought over” much more strongly so the plants do not have to pay more for corn to be 
shipped from further away. 
The existence of capacity within the county in the previous year 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 increases the 
probability of contemporaneous capacity by 96.1% compared to a county with no ethanol in the 
previous year. However, when marginal effects are examined over different levels of corn 
production, I find that the probability of ethanol capacity existing in a county when there was 
existing ethanol capacity the previous year falls with higher levels of corn production. Combined 
with results showing that higher levels of corn production are associated with higher likelihood of 
ethanol capacity, results indicate that the highest corn producing counties are most likely to contain 
ethanol capacity as well, regardless of prior ethanol capacity. Later, I discuss the results for 
determining probabilities associated with new ethanol plants as well as new ethanol capacity, 
which includes both new plants and increasing capacity at existing plants. 
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In order to determine how my findings may differ based on unobserved characteristics pre-
disposing an area to ethanol production, I examine the results from two subsets of the data; namely, 
the Top Ten ethanol producing states from 2010 and from the top ethanol and corn producing state, 
Iowa. In general, findings are similar under alternate specifications. When the model is restricted 
to the top ten ethanol producing states, the marginal effect of within county corn production is 
higher than in the full model; however when I examine the effect over varying levels of corn 
production, I find that this result only holds for lower levels of corn production, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.11. At levels greater than 25 million bushels, the marginal effect of corn production is 
higher in the Parsimonious model than in the Top Ten model. Corn production in the Iowa model 
is insignificant, however a similar pattern emerges when I compare the marginal effects between 
the Iowa and the Parsimonious results. Similar to the Parsimonious regression, starting at about 15 
to 20 million bushels of corn production, every new bushel increases the likelihood of ethanol 
capacity at an ever increasing rate. This is a common theme throughout the different specifications. 
In Iowa, corn production is dense across most of the state, therefore the insignificance of 
corn production is not surprising. The reason the marginal effect of corn production is smaller at 
higher levels than lower levels of corn production is because in the top ten ethanol producing 
states, and in Iowa in particular, the level of corn production is already high. Producing more corn 
in an area that already produces a lot does not have as great an effect as producing more corn in 
an area with a smaller average value of corn production, as is the case when the full set of data is 
considered. 
Corn production is not the only characteristic ethanol producers are interested in; otherwise 
the order of the top ten ethanol producing states would fall in line with the top ten corn producing 
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states. Though there is overlap in the top ten status for most of the states, their order in the ranks 
differ. This can be seen in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6. In the Parsimonious model, state fixed effects 
are insignificant, however as the data is restricted to the top ten ethanol producing states, state 
fixed effects become significant. It is likely that state level incentives are a driver in ethanol plant 
location decisions at the margin for locations with sufficient levels of corn production. 
When the marginal effects of an ethanol plant in the first spatial lag are compared, I find that 
the magnitude of the effect is largest in Iowa across most levels of corn production, though again 
it is less affected by different levels of corn production than results from the full regression and 
the top ten ethanol producers, as seen in Figure 2.12. However, it should be noted that the spatial 
lag of corn production is insignificant in Iowa. At smaller levels of corn production, the 
Parsimonious model returns the smallest marginal effects, though they become larger than those 
in the Top Ten states at about 30 million bushels of corn production. This indicates that when all 
data is grouped together, competition has a smaller effect at smaller levels of corn production and 
a larger effect at high levels of corn production than when the data is limited to top corn producing 
areas. 
Marginal effects of existing ethanol capacity given the mean level of corn production were 
very similar across specifications as well, though Iowa returned the lowest prediction (Table 2.5 
and Figure 2.13). When the marginal effect is examined over different levels of corn production, 
I find that the marginal effect in the Top Ten model is very similar to the Parsimonious regression 
and that the marginal effect for Iowa is smaller, though the difference in effects get smaller at 
higher levels of corn production. That existing ethanol capacity in Iowa is less of a predictor of 
where ethanol capacity will locate across most levels of corn production is likely because the 
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increase in ethanol capacity in Iowa between 2005 and 2010 is double that of the next highest 
ethanol producer, Nebraska. 
I also compare results for the Great Lakes and the Plains regions to determine if there are 
regional differences in what affects ethanol capacity location. I find that within county ethanol 
capacity and the spatial lag of corn production are significant in the Great Lakes region while the 
spatial lag of the number of plants and within county corn production are significant in the Plains 
region. These results can be seen in Table 2.5. I only include results for the Great Lakes and Plains 
regions due to the low proportion of counties with ethanol capacity in the other three regions. The 
regional breakdowns can be seen in Table 2.3 and come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The Plains region returns a much larger marginal effect for within county corn production 
than in the Great Lakes, which is consistent across different levels of corn production (Figure 
2.14). Corn production has a small marginal effect on ethanol capacity in the Great Lakes, 
remaining under 20% at all levels of corn production. In the Plains, the marginal effect of corn 
production starts out higher than in the Great Lakes and increases rapidly with higher levels of 
corn production. As for existing ethanol capacity, the marginal effect in the great lakes is 
consistently over 93%, though in the Plains the marginal effect falls to under 90% at about 35 
million bushels of corn produced. Also, the marginal effect of an ethanol plant in the first spatial 
lag of counties is more negative in the Plains than in the Great Lakes.  
In the Plains region, the spatial lag of ethanol plants, representative of competition, is 
significant and the within county existence of ethanol capacity is not. However, in the Great Lakes 
within county ethanol capacity is significant and the spatial lag is not. In the Plains, within county 
corn production is significant and the spatial lag of corn production is not, while the opposite is 
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true for the Great Lakes. Together, these results indicate that ethanol plants in the Plains are more 
influenced by competitive factors (corn production and the location of competing plants) than 
those in the Great Lakes region. This is supported by Figure 2.14. 
I also test if farmer ownership and private ownership affect capacity location differently. 
When farmer and privately owned ethanol capacity effects are separated using a dummy variable 
(Table 2.5, cont., Coop Dummy), the effect of farmer owned ethanol capacity is insignificant. The 
insignificant results may be due to the high proportion of privately owned plants. Therefore, I also 
run separate regressions for each type of plant, Private and Coop, finding different results, as can 
be seen in Table 2.5, cont. and Figure 2.15. Within county corn production is significant for Coop 
plants and the marginal effect is higher than in the Parsimonious model, while the within county 
effect of corn production for Private ethanol plants is lower and insignificant. The spatial lag of 
corn production is insignificant to Coop plants, but significant to Private ethanol plants.  
The marginal effect of ethanol capacity in the county of interest is higher for Private capacity 
than Coop capacity, though both are lower than in the Parsimonious regression across all levels of 
corn production. The spatial lag of capacity is significant for Private ethanol plants and 
insignificant for Coop capacity. The average marginal effect for Private plants is fairly constant 
across all levels of corn production. All of this put together may indicate that the location of private 
ethanol plants are more influenced by competition than farmer owned plants, and that higher 
producing corn farmers are more likely to invest in ethanol plants than lower producing corn 
farmers. It also indicates that private ethanol plant locations are more concerned with the 
availability of corn in the general region than the amount of corn produced in the county itself than 
farmer owned ethanol plants. This is likely because farmer owned plants are likely located near 
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the farmer-owners and the plants often have contracts with the farmer-owners to supply a set 
amount of corn. Farmer owned plants may experience less uncertainty in corn supply are may be 
more inclined to locate in areas with fairly certain corn production levels. 
To further examine what effects ethanol plant location, I alter the independent variable to 
reflect the existence of a new ethanol plant and the existence of new ethanol capacity, either 
through new plants or increasing capacity at existing plants. These results can be seen in Table 
2.5, cont. and Figure 2.16. Ethanol capacity within the county and ethanol plants in the surrounding 
counties negatively affect the probability of a new plant opening in the county of interest by about 
1.5% and 0.5%, respectively. When examined over varying levels of corn production, the marginal 
effects get stronger as corn production increases. A county with an ethanol plant producing 15 
million bushels of corn reduces the probability of a new plant in the county by about 1.1%; if that 
county produces 30 million bushels of corn, the marginal effect of existing ethanol capacity falls 
to about -3.8%. However, existing ethanol capacity in a county producing 15 million bushels of 
corn is associated with a probability of new ethanol capacity in that county of 7.6%; if that county 
produces 30 million bushels of corn, the average marginal effect of existing ethanol capacity 
increases to 11.8%. An ethanol plant in the surrounding counties has a negative marginal effect 
for both new plants and new capacity, though it is larger for new plants at larger levels of corn 
production. These results indicate that the supply of corn and competition from other ethanol plants 
is more of a factor for new ethanol plants than for existing ethanol plants expanding capacity. 
These results also suggest that plants in higher corn producing areas are more likely to expand than 
counties producing smaller levels of corn. 
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When I include the temporal lag of total ethanol capacity within the county as well as the 
temporal lag of the existence of ethanol capacity, I find that the marginal effect of corn production 
in the county increases with the level of ethanol capacity, up to a point (Figure 2.17). As the level 
of ethanol capacity in the previous year increases, the probability of ethanol capacity in the 
contemporaneous year becomes more reliant on corn production and less reliant on the existence 
of ethanol capacity. At about 150 MGY of ethanol capacity in the county in the previous year, corn 
production has a larger effect on probability of ethanol capacity than the other factors, including 
the existence of ethanol capacity. At about 200 MGY of ethanol capacity, the marginal effect of 
corn production starts to fall, though the average marginal effect remains higher than the other 
variables. This may be because there are not many counties where ethanol capacity is higher than 
250 MGY and the results should not be taken too seriously. However, it may also indicate that the 
largest ethanol plants choose locations based on different factors than ethanol plants closer to the 
average level of capacity. 
As robustness checks, I estimate the parsimonious regression using regional fixed effects, 
excluding both regional and state fixed effects, excluding spatial variables, and running the 
regression as a logit and as a Poisson. Qualitatively, results were very similar to the reported 
results. In general, marginal effects are larger when spatial variables are excluded and smaller 
when location fixed effects are excluded, with the difference from the Parsimonious regression 
getting larger as more corn is produced in the county. In the regional fixed effects model, the 
results are very close to the results under excluding locational fixed effects, with the exception of 
the spatial lag of ethanol plants. The marginal effect of the spatial lag of ethanol plants is negative 
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under regional fixed effects and slightly positive under no locational fixed effects, however the 
spatial lag effects are insignificant in both specifications. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Plant and location characteristics are significant factors in ethanol plant location choice. 
These results show that competition from other ethanol plants is more influential to privately 
owned ethanol plants than farmer owned ethanol plants, as well as for ethanol produced in the 
Plains regions as opposed to in the Great Lakes region. Factors affecting ethanol plant location 
decisions are not necessarily factors that are under control of regions looking to attract new ethanol 
production, mainly the level of corn production as well as the level and locations of existing 
ethanol capacity in the region. However, there may be ways for municipalities to work within those 
existing factors to become more desirable to ethanol producers, for example using appropriate tax 
breaks or subsidies.  
This paper provides an analysis of a maturing ethanol industry while accounting for spatial 
spillovers. The results I present can inform the future growth of the ethanol industry, providing 
information on relative attractiveness of a county based on its location and type of ethanol plant 
ownership, as well as the differences in new ethanol plants versus existing plants looking to 
increase capacity.  Groups interested in increasing ethanol production in their area can tailor 
potential policies to their location and the type of plant they want to attract. For example, I show 
that the location of farmer owned plants is more influenced by corn production in the county and 
less concerned with competition from other plants than private ethanol plant location decisions. In 
a region where corn production is not a factor in ethanol location and there are many ethanol plants, 
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as in the Plains, potential policies may focus on boosting the attractiveness of owning an ethanol 
plant to local farmers.  
Knowing where ethanol capacity locates and what truly affects location decisions provides 
insight into the possible ramifications of policy changes. Under regulations like the RFS, ethanol 
growth is encouraged. As ethanol production meets, and surpasses, the level required under the 
national level regulation, and if regulations (like the RFS) change or are dropped, groups interested 
in continuing expansion within the ethanol industry may need to find outside incentives for 
continued ethanol growth.  
In the current phase of the maturing ethanol industry meeting the mandated ethanol 
production level, the rate of growth in corn based ethanol capacity has slowed considerably from 
2007/2008. Attracting ethanol production, or keeping the production facilities already in place, 
may become more of an issue to decision makers in the U.S. Gasoline blended to be 10% ethanol 
(E10) or more has been shown to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation, local air 
pollution, and reduce reliance on imported fuel. Communities interested in decreasing polluting 
emissions may want to increase the availability of E15 (15% ethanol, 85% gasoline) and higher 
ethanol blends, as well as producing the necessary ethanol to sustain the blends4. The availability 
of the higher blends, as well as reducing the distance the ethanol has to travel would be beneficial 
in reducing total emissions in the county. In addition, ethanol plants create jobs beyond the location 
of the plant, extending into surrounding counties as well as additional industries, and they have 
been shown to increase tax revenue and incomes. Understanding how local conditions affect 
                                                 
4 Cars built after 1980 can use E-10, and most cars built after 2001 can use E-15. More vehicles are being built that 
can use up to E-85, but as of 2014, not even 7% of motor vehicles was capable of running on E-85. 
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ethanol plant location decisions is just one step in understanding how changes in the ethanol 
industry can ripple across the economy of the United States. 
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2.8 Tables 
 
Table 2.1. P-values from t-tests of new plant capacity mean comparisons 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
2005 < 0.266 0.075 0.008 0.009 
!= 0.532 0.150 0.016 0.018 
> 0.734 0.925 0.992 0.991 
2006 <  0.126 0.008 0.011 
!=  0.252 0.015 0.021 
>  0.874 0.993 0.99 
2007 <   0.084 0.059 
!=   0.169 0.118 
>   0.916 0.941 
2008 <    0.199 
!=    0.399 
>    0.800 
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Table 2.2. Ethanol plant capacity (million gallons per year), 2005 and 2010 
 
 Counties With 
Ethanol Plants 
Mean Capacity 
Minimum 
Capacity 
Maximum 
Capacity 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Total 79 163 52.7 75.8 1.5 1.5 274 465 
Arkansas 0 0 - - - - - - 
Colorado 1 3 42 40.7 42 40 42 42 
Illinois 5 11 154.8 111.5 40 37 274 290 
Indiana 1 11 102 83 102 40 102 115 
Iowa 18 35 62.9 101.3 5 20 260 465 
Kansas 6 10 20.75 44.4 1.5 1.5 45 110 
Kentucky 1 1 24 33 24 33 24 33 
Michigan 1 5 50 53 50 50 50 57 
Minnesota 14 20 35.2 56.7 18 18 52 225 
Mississippi 0 1 - 54 - 54 - 54 
Missouri 3 6 36.6 43.5 20 20 45 55 
Nebraska 10 23 54.3 76.7 17.5 25 114 300 
North Dakota 2 6 16.8 59.7 10.5 10 23 110 
Ohio 0 7 - 76.9 - 54 - 110 
Oklahoma 0 0 - - - - - - 
South Dakota 10 13 47.5 78.2 9 11 120 220 
Tennessee 1 2 67 91 67 67 67 115 
Wisconsin 5 8 37.6 62.3 4 40 49 130 
Wyoming 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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Table 2.3. Bureau of Economic Analysis regions 
Region States 
Total Ethanol Capacity 
(100 MGY) 
2005 2010 
Great Lakes IL, IN, MI, OH, WI 1114 3484.8 
Plains 
IA, KS, MN, MO, 
NE, ND, SD 
2910.9 8523.4 
Rocky Mountain CO, WY 47 127 
Southeast AK, KY, MS, TN 91 269 
Southwest OK 0 0 
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Table 2.4. Regression results, direction and significance5 
Variable Full  
Parsi-
monious 
Regions No Space 
Coop 
Dummies 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  - ** - * -  - * 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  +     
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  +     
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 (1m bu.) + ** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 (1m bu.) + + ** +  + ** 
𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) -     
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) +     
𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊 (100 head) +     
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊  (100 head) +     
𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊 (100 head) +     
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊  (100 head) +     
𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊 (100 head) -     
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊  (100 head) +     
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒕−𝟏  -     
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  -     
𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒊  +     
𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏  -     
𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  +     
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  +     
𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  -     
𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏* 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏     + 
𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏*∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏     - 
Constant - - - *** - - 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊  No No Yes No No 
N 7931 7931 7931 7931 7931 
PMC 0.081 0.081    
PRE 0.741 0.814    
EPCP 0.746 0.814    
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                                 
5 Variables are the existence of ethanol capacity, corn production, livestock, natural gas price, density of rail lines, 
local tax burden, population density, unemployment rate, median income, the existence of coop owned ethanol 
plants, spatial lags of the number of ethanol plants, corn production, livestock and the number of coop owned 
ethanol plants where i is county and t is year. 
 43 
 
Table 2.5. Average marginal effects6 
 
Variable 
Parsi-
monious 
Top Ten Iowa 
Great 
Lakes 
Plains 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.961*** 
(0.011) 
0.96*** 
(0.008) 
0.922*** 
(0.018) 
0.973*** 
(0.010) 
0.956*** 
(0.009) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
-0.004* 
(0.010) 
-0.005* 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.059) 
-0.0004 
(0.025) 
-0.007* 
(0.017) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.079*** 
(0.019) 
0.098*** 
(0.028) 
0.147 
(0.015) 
0.036 
(0.033) 
0.157*** 
(0.039) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.013** 
(0.028) 
0.019** 
(0.041) 
0.056 
(0.024) 
0.020** 
(0.047) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊  No No No No No 
N 7931 4275 495 2185 3080 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
                                                 
6 Variables are the existence of ethanol capacity, corn production, and the spatial lags of the number of ethanol 
plants and corn production where i is county and t is year. 
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Table 2.6. Average marginal effects, cont.7 
 
Variable 
Coop 
Dummy 
Private Coop 
New 
Plant 
New Cap 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.956*** 
(0.018) 
0.607*** 
(0.025) 
0.331*** 
(0.028) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.066*** 
(0.011) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
-0.003* 
(0.010) 
-0.006* 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.005* 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.079*** 
(0.019) 
0.033 
(0.031) 
0.132*** 
(0.029) 
0.113*** 
(0.027) 
0.096*** 
(0.025) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.013** 
(0.028) 
0.022** 
(0.045) 
-0.010 
(0.047) 
0.021** 
(0.041) 
0.012 
(0.038) 
𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏* 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.036 
(0.064) 
    
𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏*
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
    
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7931 6571 5608   
  
                                                 
7 Variables are the existence of ethanol capacity, corn production, the existence of coop owned ethanol plants, and 
the spatial lags of the number of ethanol plants, corn production, and the number of coop owned ethanol plants 
where i is county and t is year. 
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2.9 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1. 2007 corn yields and ethanol plant locations 
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Figure 2.2. Histogram of new ethanol plant capacities by year 
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Figure 2.3. Proportion of total observations with existing ethanol capacity over time 
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Figure 2.4. First and second order Queen’s contiguity example 
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Figure 2.5. Farmer and private ethanol capacity and corn production by state, 2005 
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Figure 2.6. Farmer and private ethanol capacity and corn production by state, 2010 
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Figure 2.7. Change in ethanol capacity from 2005 to 2010 by state 
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Figure 2.8. Major rail lines and ethanol plant locations in 2010 
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Figure 2.9. Regional farmer and private capacity in 2005 and 2010 
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Figure 2.10. Average marginal effects for over different levels of corn production (million bu.) 
for the Parsimonious model 
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Figure 2.11. Average marginal effect of the temporal lag of corn production, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏, 
over varying levels of corn production for the Parsimonious, Top Ten and Iowa rmodels 
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Figure 2.12. Average marginal effect of the spatial lag of the number of ethanol plants, 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏, for the Parsimonious, Top Ten and Iowa regressions over varying levels 
of corn production 
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Figure 2.13. Average marginal effect of the temporal lag of existing ethanol capacity, 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏, for Parsimonious, Top Ten and Iowa regressions over varying levels of corn 
production  
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Figure 2.14. Average marginal effects over different levels of corn production for Great Lakes 
(GL) and Plains (P) 
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Figure 2.15. Average marginal effects for private and coop regressions over different levels of 
corn production (million bushels) 
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Figure 2.16. Average marginal effects of new plant and new capacity regressions 
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Figure 2.17. Average marginal effects of parsimonious regression under differing levels of 
ethanol capacity 
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2.10 Supplemental Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.7. Average marginal results 
 
Variable 
No Loc. 
Dumms 
No Space Regions 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.972*** 
(0.006) 
0.962*** 
(0.011) 
0.966*** 
(0.009) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
0.0001 
(0.007) 
 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 (1m bu.) 
0.062*** 
(0.017) 
0.103*** 
(0.016) 
0.064*** 
(0.017) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
 
0.005 
(0.022) 
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  Yes Yes Yes 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  No Yes No 
𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊  No No Yes 
N 7931 7171 7546 
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Table 2.8. Regression results using capacity levels 
Variable Full Reg. Pars. 
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  + *** + *** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  - *** - ** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  -  
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  +  
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 (1m bu.) + *** + *** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
+ + * 
𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) -  
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) + *  
𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊 (100 head) +  
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊  (100 head) +  
𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊 (100 head) +  
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊  
 (100 head) 
-  
𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊 (100 head) -  
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊  (100 head) -  
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒕−𝟏  -  
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  -  
𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒊  +  
𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏  -  
𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  +  
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  -  
𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  -  
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  Yes Yes 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  Yes Yes 
N 7931 7931 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 2.9. Marginal results for the logit regression, regional fixed effects and the top ten ethanol 
producing states data subset for the full regression 
Variable Logit Regions Top Ten  
𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.145*** 
(0.017) 
0.146*** 
(0.013) 
0.206*** 
(0.019) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
-0.005** 
(0.011) 
-0.004* 
(0.010) 
-0.007** 
(0.016) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
0.0007 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
0.0006 
(0.021) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒏𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕−𝟏  
0.0003 
(0.018) 
0.0001 
(0.017) 
0.0007 
(0.026) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 (1m bu.) 
0.00007** 
(0.00002) 
0.060** 
(0.021) 
0.099** 
(0.033) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
(1m bu.) 
0.0009 
(0.036) 
0.004 
(0.029) 
0.013 
(0.049) 
𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) 
-0.00002 
(0.00004) 
-0.000006 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00006) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) 
0.00001 
(0.00006) 
0.000001 
(0.00005) 
0.00001 
(0.00009) 
𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊 (100 head) 
0.000002 
(0.000002) 
0.000003 
(0.000003) 
0.000003 
(0.000004) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊  (100 head) 
0.0000003 
(0.000004) 
0.000001 
(0.000004) 
0.000002 
(0.000006) 
𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊 (100 head) 
0.0000002 
(0.0000002) 
0.00000002 
(0.0000002) 
0.0000004 
(0.0000003) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊  
 (100 head) 
-0.00000003 
(0.0000004) 
-0.00000009 
(0.0000003) 
0.0000001 
(0.0000008) 
𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊 (100 head) 
-0.000008 
(0.00001) 
-0.000001 
(0.00001) 
-0.000004 
(0.00001) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊  (100 head) 
0.000002 
(0.00001) 
0.000008 
(0.00001) 
0.000001 
(0.00002) 
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒕−𝟏  
-0.000002 
(0.000002) 
-0.0000004 
(0.0000003) 
-0.000002 
(0.000002) 
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒊  
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏  
-0.797 
(1.221) 
-0.178 
(0.233) 
-1.43 
(1.79) 
𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.0002 
(0.00009) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
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Table 2.9. (cont.)   
 
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.00005 
(0.001) 
-0.00004 
(0.002) 
𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  Yes Yes Yes 
𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊  Yes No Yes 
𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊  No Yes No 
N 6569 7274 4036 
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Figure 2.18. Average marginal effect of existing ethanol under excluding regional fixed effects, 
excluding spatial variables and excluding locational fixed effects over varying levels of corn 
production 
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Figure 2.19. Average marginal effect of corn production under excluding regional fixed effects, 
excluding spatial variables and excluding locational fixed effects over varying levels of corn 
production 
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Figure 2.20. Average marginal effect of the spatial lag of an ethanol plant under excluding 
regional fixed effects, excluding spatial variables and excluding locational fixed effects over 
varying levels of corn production 
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3. Changing Ethanol Capacity’s Effect on Local Corn Basis 
 
Collaborators: Mindy Mallory and Kathy Baylis 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper, I use monthly county level data from 19 Corn Belt states spanning December 
2005 through September 2010 in a two stage fixed effect spatial panel regression to estimate how 
the expansion of the ethanol industry affect local corn prices. The first stage is used to estimate an 
exogenous level of capacity for each county, which is then used in the second stage to determine 
the effect increasing ethanol capacity has on local corn basis. To my knowledge, I am the first to 
account for the endogeneity of ethanol plant location and capacity choices on local basis levels. I 
find that not accounting for the endogenous location decision results in an underestimate of the 
effect of a change in ethanol capacity on basis, and I find significant basis effects from changes in 
ethanol capacity in the surrounding areas. The corn industry is one of the largest agricultural 
sectors in the United States. Knowing if ethanol plants do indeed affect local corn prices, and the 
factors that affect the magnitude of that effect, is crucial to understanding the economic impact of 
changing plant capacities. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Ethanol demand increased over 166% from 2006 to 2014, and ethanol production has gone 
from 3.9 billion gallons in 2005 to about 14.3 billion gallons in 2014, which requires roughly 5.7 
billion bushels of corn to produce (USDA-ERS 2015; RFA 2015). The rapid expansion was largely 
driven by the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) which mandated that 15 billion gallons per 
year of ethanol be produced by 2022. In May 2015, the EPA proposed new mandates of 13.25, 
13.40 and 14.00 billion gallons per year for 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively (EPA 2015). As of 
the 2011/2012 marketing year, ethanol is the largest user of corn in the U.S.: almost 40% of corn 
went into ethanol production, with about 36.3% going to feed and residuals and 12.3% going into 
exports (Wisner 2015). In this chapter, I ask how the ethanol industry affected the local corn price 
received by farmers. As ethanol production fluctuates to reflect new supply or demand incentives, 
demand for corn – and the price received by farmers – fluctuates as well. Understanding how 
changing mandates in the ethanol industry affect corn prices can inform decisions being made by 
farmers and investors in the corn industry, which is the largest US agricultural industry in terms 
of both harvested acreage and cash receipts.  
The ethanol expansion did not affect all areas in the Corn Belt equally. Although the increase 
in ethanol production capacity happened largely in the Midwestern Corn Belt, production capacity 
is not uniformly distributed across this region. Figure 3.1 illustrates ethanol plant locations on a 
map of United States corn yields. Ethanol plants tend to be located in counties with higher corn 
yields, but even accounting for yield does not fully explain the ethanol plant locations.  
Corn prices also increased dramatically over the same time period as the ethanol expansion. 
Figure 3.2 shows the commensurate U.S. corn price series over this time; in 2005 prices were just 
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under $2.00 per bushel in 2005, in 2008 prices were approximately $5.50 per bushel, and by 2010 
prices had fallen back to slightly under $4.00 per bushel (USDA-NASS 2010). Therefore, prices 
rose about $3.50 between 2005 and 2008, during the most rapid expansion of ethanol capacity, 
and then price fell by about a dollar per bushel between 2008 and 2010. Given the non-uniform 
distribution of ethanol plant locations, the effect of increasing ethanol capacity on local corn prices 
varied across space as well. Figure 3.3 shows ethanol plant locations represented by pentagons, 
whose size indicates production capacity, overlaid on a map of U.S. Midwestern states shaded by 
corn basis in $/bu where basis is defined as the difference between the local cash price and the 
nearby futures price. Panel A contains data from December 2005 and panel B contains data from 
December 2009 to show both the increase in ethanol production capacity and its effect on local 
basis. Anecdotally, it seems that in December 2009, basis was generally weaker (local corn prices 
relatively lower than the futures prices), except in locations near a lot of ethanol plants.  
In 2009, the highest corn prices relative to futures were found in the North. The geographic 
relationship of basis was fairly straightforward, with corn prices falling relative to futures as they 
approached strong demand areas, notably the near the Mississippi river area between Iowa and 
Illinois, Chicago and the Gulf Port at the South end of the Mississippi River. Though the basis 
situation in 2009 was, in essence, similar the relatively simple downhill path of Northwest to South 
and Southeast seen earlier became much more convoluted. On the surface, the new, more 
complicated geographic relationship appears to be associated with the large contingent of new corn 
demand the cropped up in the form of ethanol plants, changing the downhill flow of basis similar 
to the way a rock causes water to change direction. This chapter will help scratch the surface of 
how much of that change is directly due to new ethanol capacity. 
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To capture variation in local corn markets, I use local corn basis. In addition to reflecting 
local supply and demand conditions, the basis is also expected to capture both local storage and 
transport costs. Local basis informs the choice between selling corn today vs. storing it in hopes 
local prices increase. If an ethanol plant opens or increases capacity, the plant may need to offer 
higher prices to incentivize farmers to sell to them instead of storing or selling into more traditional 
outlets like the local grain elevator. Alternatively, ethanol plants that open nearby incur lower 
transportation costs than the local elevator and farmers may be willing to accept a lower price to 
take advantage of lower transportation costs. This creates an a priori ambiguous effect on local 
corn basis. 
In this chapter I use an econometric model to measure the effect of ethanol plant location on 
corn basis. Specifically, I use a two stage fixed effect spatial model to determine how the expansion 
of the ethanol industry affected local corn prices throughout the Midwest from 2007 to 2010. The 
intuition for the mechanism by which the price effect takes place is as follows: Because corn prices 
account for a major portion of ethanol production costs, ethanol producers are likely to locate 
where corn price is low and availability is high relative to other locations. Figure 3.1, Figure 3.3, 
and the results from chapter 2 confirm this. More ethanol plants are located where corn production 
is high compared to locations where corn production is low. These ethanol plants create new 
demand centers for corn and have to compete with livestock producers, elevators and possibly 
other ethanol plants. Due to the large volume of corn in these areas it is feasible that ethanol plants 
and alternative demand centers are close enough that there is little to no transportation cost savings 
to farmers from selling corn to the ethanol plant versus the alternative. Therefore, this increase in 
demand for local corn is likely to create an increase the local price of corn. 
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It is also true that ethanol plant locations would be expected to affect local corn prices 
(comparing panel A and B of Figure 3.3 is suggestive of this). That said, previous empirical work 
has not always found that ethanol production affects grain prices. Further, this work does not 
account for the endogeneity between the location decision and local prices, (see McNew and 
Griffeth (2005), Lewis (2010) and O’Brien (2009)). I extend this line of research by estimating 
how ethanol plant capacity affects the level and spatial distribution of corn basis, while controlling 
for endogenous plant location and capacity decisions. I first estimate the site and capacity choice 
of ethanol plants using instrumental variables, and then use those estimates to determine how 
ethanol plants affect local corn basis and how this effect is distributed through space.  
Research by Lambert et al. (2008) and Sarmiento and Wilson (2008) show that ethanol plant 
owners choose locations based not only on corn price and production but on factors like natural 
gas prices, local labor markets and taxes. Therefore, the instruments I use to predict location choice 
include the flow of natural gas, the cost of natural gas and the cost of diesel fuel, as well as county 
demographics and the pre-existing ethanol production in and around the county of interest. This 
technique, however, leads to further difficulties of introducing spatial simultaneity and temporal 
correlation in capacity choice. I solve these problems by instrumenting for the temporal and spatial 
lags of capacity within the first stage. 
I see several contributions to this research. First, to my knowledge, I am the first to account 
for the endogeneity of ethanol plant location and capacity choices on local basis levels. Second, 
using novel panel data from 2005 through 2010 across the Corn Belt, I am able to account for 
booming ethanol growth in earlier years and slower paced growth in the maturing market of the 
later years. I also account for all new capacity, regardless of whether a new plant is opening or an 
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existing plant is expanding. Previous research examines new ethanol plants opening within an 
arbitrary draw radius regardless of size of the ethanol plant, however I employ a queen contiguity 
weighting scheme which allows me to explore how the effect of increasing ethanol capacity 
changes with distance from the county of interest. I examine differential effects of ethanol capacity 
on local basis depending on ethanol plant ownership structure.  
In the first stage, I find that farmer owned co-operatives are associated with higher ethanol 
capacity. In the second stage, I find that not accounting for the endogenous location decision results 
in an underestimate of the effect of a change in ethanol capacity on basis. I also find significant 
basis effects from changes in ethanol capacity in the surrounding areas. Previous studies found 
that on average, a new ethanol plant increases basis between 2.21 cents/bu. and 12.5 cents/bu. My 
results are comparable: I find that an increase of 100 MGY of ethanol capacity leads to a basis 
increase of about 4 cents/bu. within the same county.8 I find the effect decays over space and that 
the effect is stronger when corn supplies are tight. The available information on U.S. corn stocks 
at the beginning of 2007 indicated a large supply of corn as just under 2,000 million bushels. At 
the beginning of 2008, available information indicated that stocks were much lower, just over 
1,250 million bushels. The within county effect of a 100MGY increase in ethanol capacity is just 
over 1 cent per bushel higher in 2008 than in 2007. Not only are the effects larger, but they also 
decay at a faster rate. 
                                                 
8 My data set includes larger ethanol plants, on average, than the previous studies, as well as all changes in ethanol 
capacity, not just new plants coming online. If I assume 50MGY, closer to the capacity assumed in previous 
literature, my results are closer to the low end of findings. The use of 100MGY comes from the assumptions and 
characteristics Iowa State Extension’s Ag Decision Maker makes in ethanol plant research.  
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This research has important implications for stakeholders in the corn market. Knowing how 
an ethanol plant affects basis, local policy makers may create incentives to attract, keep or improve 
ethanol production in the area. Higher corn prices benefit not only local farmers, but the economy 
of the area as whole. Also, if co-op owned plants affect basis differently than privately owned 
plants, it should influence types of incentives as well as farmer decisions of whether or not to 
invest in a plant; if the price of corn increases enough after a farmer owned plant opens to cause 
profits to increase, it may be beneficial to own a plant in their area. Farmers would get profit both 
from the plant and from increased corn prices. The corn industry is one of the largest agricultural 
sectors in the United States. Knowing if ethanol plants do indeed affect corn prices, and what the 
magnitude of that effect depends on, is crucial to understanding changing plant capacities and 
possible drivers thereof, like the RFA, affect corn producers. For example, with a reduction in the 
RFS mandate, the amount of ethanol that must be blended into gasoline by 2016 is lower than the 
amount of ethanol produced in 2014. Unless demand in other markets, namely exports, increases, 
demand for ethanol in the U.S. is expected to stay fairly constant, if not fall. This leads to many 
possible scenarios, for example; some ethanol plants may reduce production, or close all together, 
leading to a decrease in ethanol capacity in certain counties. Some ethanol investors may take 
advantage of economies of scale and increase capacity at an existing plant or build new, larger 
plants, leading to an increase in capacity in certain counties. Understanding how those ripples in 
ethanol capacity affect local corn price is important in determining further possible impacts to corn 
producers and buyers and decision made by policy makers. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature. Section 
3 describes the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data, and sections 5 and 6 contain a 
discussion of the results and conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
McNew and Griffeth (2005) estimate a spatial error model to quantify the impact of 
introducing an ethanol plant on monthly regional corn basis using data between 2001 through 2003 
for 12 ethanol plants. The authors estimate the effect of a new ethanol plant on the local basis at 
corn elevators within 150 miles of the new plant. McNew and Griffeth assume that there is spatial 
correlation in the errors of their empirical model stemming from positive correlations in basis 
between any two markets that are within 50 miles of each other. The authors correct for spatial 
autocorrelation using Anselin’s maximum likelihood method (to learn more, see Anselin, 1998). 
They find that the opening of an ethanol plant has a significant positive effect of 12.5 cents per 
bushel on the average basis at the ethanol plant site, and has a significant positive effect of 5.9 
cents per bushel on average over the 150 mile region, indicating that the price effect is concentrated 
around the ethanol plant. The authors further allow price effects to change with the distance 
between the new ethanol plant and the basis market, finding that average basis effects are non-
uniform over space, and each plant’s effect on market price persisted for a radius of between 31 
and 104 miles from the plant.  
Using a method similar to that of McNew and Griffeth (2005), O’Brien (2009) finds that 
ethanol plant proximity does not affect corn prices in Kansas in 2008. O’Brien and Woolverton 
(2009) posit that this difference in findings may be because plants may not be exogenously located, 
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as is assumed by O’Brien (2009) and McNew and Griffeth (2005). They also point out that the 
data used by O’Brien (2009) do not include any pre-ethanol plant information. With no pre-plant 
information, it is not possible to compare results from before the plants opened to after the plants 
opened. 
Lewis (2010) studies 35 ethanol plants opening in four states (Michigan, Kansas, Iowa and 
Indiana) over 10 years (September 1998 through June 2008) (Lewis 2010). The research follows 
the same process as McNew and Griffeth (2009), including the use of Anselin’s maximum 
likelihood weights matrix to correct for spatially correlated errors, and finds similar results. The 
average impacts on basis near the ethanol plant are 12.97 cents in Michigan, 9.55 cents in Kansas, 
2.41 cents in Iowa and 2.21 cents in Indiana. Lewis also introduces a model which allows the basis 
effect to change with the number of months the plant has been open. They find the price effect 
decreases with the number of months the plant is open, and is statistically significant for 16 of the 
35 plants. Michigan and Kansas see the largest basis effect in the month after an ethanol plant 
opens, where basis in the first month after a plant opens increases 14.10 and 11.02 cents 
respectively. Iowa and Indiana see much smaller effects with basis increasing 2.07 cents in Iowa 
and decreasing 0.29 cents in Indiana. 
Fortenbery and Park (2008) use a system of simultaneous supply and demand equations to 
determine the effect ethanol production has on the U.S. national corn price, focusing on the short 
run price elasticity of corn with respect to ethanol production. The authors aggregate data to a 
quarterly, national level. Fortenbery and Park (2008) conclude that a 1% increase in production 
leads to a 0.16% increase in corn price, ceteris paribus. They go further, suggesting that about 41 
cents of the $1.34 per bushel increase in cash corn price between the first quarter of 2006/2007 
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and December 2007 was due to the almost doubling in ethanol production capacity in the U.S. 
This means that less than 1/3 of the increase in the U.S. corn price in 2007 was due to increases in 
domestic ethanol production. 
Katchova (2009) uses a Differences-in-Differences (DD) technique in an attempt to 
distinguish the effect of the opening of an ethanol plant on prices over time and space. She focuses 
on corn prices in eight states; Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and 
Wisconsin. The difference in prices close to the ethanol plant from before and after an ethanol 
plant opens are compared to the difference in prices farther away from the plant from before and 
after the ethanol plant opens. Katchova (2009) uses the county and zip code average of contract 
prices for corn received by farmers for marketing contracts9 from USDA-ARMS, for an the initial 
time period of 2005 and a final time period of 2007. The choice of 2005 for the initial time period 
of the study is arbitrary, however results are robust to the choice of other initial time periods. Her 
results are different from those in the McNew and Griffeth (2005) study: farmers located within 
the same zip code or county after an ethanol plant opened do not receive a significantly higher 
price increase than those located in another zip code or county. Katchova (2009) does discover 
that for farmers located in the same zip code as an ethanol plant, corn contract prices decreased by 
10.9 cents, however the author points out that this significant decrease in price is due to unobserved 
differences between characteristically similar, geographically distant locations and may not be due 
                                                 
9 Marketing contracts include any contract that specifies a price, or a mechanism to determine price, a time and place 
for delivery, and the quantity to be delivered, with the terms determined before harvest and where control of the crop 
and production practices remain with the farmer until delivery (MacDonald and Korb 2006). An example of this 
would be forward contracts.  
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to the ethanol plants themselves. The lower prices may indicate that ethanol plants locate in areas 
where corn price is low relative to other similar locations. 
One concern with the past literature is that it takes ethanol plant location decisions as 
exogenous. Ethanol plant location and capacity decisions are not just non-random, but are affected 
by corn prices and production levels (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002; Sarmiento and 
Wilson 2008). To my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the local price effect of changing 
ethanol capacity controlling for the endogenous location and capacity choice of the ethanol plants. 
 
3.3 Method 
To determine the effect ethanol plant capacity has on local corn basis while accounting for 
the endogeneity in the ethanol plant location decision, I use a two stage approach. The first stage 
predicts the total ethanol capacity in each county using local ethanol cost and demand variables 
such as population density, median income and natural gas prices as instruments. The choice of 
these variables comes from two particular studies of ethanol plant location decisions, Lambert, et 
al. (2008) and Sarmiento and Wilson (2008), who found these variables to be correlated with 
ethanol plant location. The first stage predicts the endogenous variable (ethanol capacity location 
and timing) as a function of exogenous and instrumental variables. This predicted variable is then 
used as an explanatory variable in the second stage equation. Included in the second stage model 
are estimates of transportation costs, plant ownership structure, and month and year dummies. The 
monthly time dummies are for the seasonality in corn prices. Year dummies are used to account 
for changes that take place across all locations over time; for example changes in national energy 
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policies. County level fixed effects account for unobserved, time-invariant differences in counties; 
for example transportation infrastructure or soil productivity.  
County level fixed effects also account for at least part of the effect of local competition for 
corn from industries not explicitly accounted for in the model, for example, grain elevators and 
corn oil processors. This is supported by the fact that the level of corn used for feed and seed 
processing in the U.S. has not changed much over time (Wallander, Claassen and Nickerson 2011). 
However, the prevalence of shuttle loaders, elevators with the ability to handle loading very large 
grain trains, has increased over the same general time period as the ethanol industry. These large 
capacity elevators are both new facilities as well as upgrades to existing elevators. Shuttle loaders, 
and other elevators, not only compete with ethanol plants for corn, but may also work with ethanol 
plants to supply corn when it is needed through storage contracts, leading to an ambiguous effect 
on both the location and capacity of ethanol plants, as well as on the effect on local basis (Hardy 
et al. 2006). Ethanol plants do not usually have enough on-site storage to house all the corn needed 
to produce ethanol throughout the year, so they either buy relatively small amounts of corn fairly 
continuously throughout the year or have contracts for larger storage areas and/or delivery of corn 
at pre-agreed upon times throughout the year. In this way, elevators are competitor and ally to 
ethanol plants. This two-sided relationship also muddies the affect the increasing storage capacity 
of the shuttle loaders has on local corn basis: though the increased storage capacity leads to 
increased direct demand, this effect is mitigated by ethanol plants working with local elevators in 
addition to the local farmers.  
I use a queen contiguity weighting mechanism to account for both varying distance from the 
county of interest as well as varying capacity changes. Distance rings were considered, however 
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counties that cross distance bands would be double counted, causing multicollinearity in the spatial 
lags. K-nearest neighbors matrices were also considered, however they were discarded because 
counties are of different sizes and counties have different numbers of neighbors. Using queen 
contiguities allows me to determine how ethanol capacity affects change over space while ensuring 
each ring of counties is independent of the others. Previous research has focused on the effect of a 
new ethanol plant opening within a certain radius, regardless of the capacity of that new plant. 
With the queen contiguities, I am able to examine the effect of increasing or decreasing capacity 
levels in the county of interest, where the local cash price is generated, as well as in the surrounding 
region. I am also able to account for existing ethanol capacity and its location with respect to the 
county of interest. Previous research ignored existing ethanol capacity. 
Three pitfalls of using this instrumental variable technique are: 1) the possibility that 
endogeneity does not exist; 2) that the instruments are not strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variable or are correlated with the dependent variable; and 3) that the instruments are correlated 
with the error term. If endogeneity does not exist yet instruments are used, the instrumental 
variables technique is inefficient and the simple OLS technique should be used. If the instruments 
are “weak” (not highly correlated with the endogenous variable) results tend to be biased toward 
OLS estimates. If the instruments are not valid, the instruments themselves may be correlated with 
the error term, and the estimation results will be biased. 
If residuals from one period are correlated with the residuals from previous periods, the 
standard errors are biased. Therefore, before estimating any equations at the first or second stage, 
I use the Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation. I find evidence that serial autocorrelation 
exists. The solution I employ is to include temporally lagged dependent variables using the 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) approach. In addition, to account for the unobserved individual effects 
of each county, I use a random or a fixed effects model. I perform a Hausman test to determine 
which method is more appropriate, finding that random effects are inconsistent; therefore, I use 
fixed effects.  
I also test for stationarity in ethanol capacity and basis. I find I cannot reject the presence of 
unit roots in ethanol capacity, however I do reject the existence of unit roots in basis. Though the 
Levin-Lin-Chu test finds evidence of non-stationarity in ethanol capacity, I do not correct for it by 
differencing the data. I do not difference because I only use the predicted capacities from the first 
stage to get an exogenous estimate of county level ethanol capacity; I do not make inferences based 
on the, potentially spurious, relationships estimated in the first stage. 
3.3.1 First Stage 
In the first stage, I regress county level ethanol capacity on exogenous variables including 
instruments to predict capacity. Then I use predicted capacity as an explanatory variable in the 
second stage. 
The baseline model for the first stage is 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜶
𝒙𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶
𝒛𝒁𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜹 ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑿𝒋,𝒕) + 𝜶
𝒚𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 are the exogenous variables, 𝒁𝒊,𝒕 are the instrumental variables, ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1  are the spatial 
weights matrices of order k , 𝑿𝒋,𝒕 are the spatial exogenous variables, 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 are the year dummies, 
𝜶𝒙, 𝜶𝒛, 𝜶𝒚 are the coefficients on 𝑿𝒊,𝒕, 𝒁𝒊,𝒕, and 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕, and 𝜹 are the coefficients on the spatial lag 
variables. 
Because the method I use includes time and space variations of the left hand side variable 
(ethanol capacity), I must account for both spatial simultaneity and serial correlation. Spatial 
(Eq. 3.1) 
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simultaneity stems from the fact that each county is included in the spatial lags of their neighbor’s, 
and that neighbor is included in their spatial lag; in other words, I have a problem where each 
county is its neighbor’s neighbor. This problem can be seen in Figure 3.4, where county i has 
county 𝑗1 as a neighbor and county 𝑗1 has county i as a neighbor. I solve this problem by 
instrumenting for the spatial capacity lags (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡) with higher order spatial lags of all the 
exogenous and instrumental variables (Anselin, Gallo and Jayet 2008). The general equation is 
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝜸 ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘+𝑙𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑿𝒋,𝒕) + +𝜶
𝒚𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜶
𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
where ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) is the spatial lag of ethanol capacity of county i at time t, ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘+𝑙𝑛
𝑗=1  
are the weights matrices, where k+l indicates the order, 𝑿𝒋,𝒕 are the exogenous spatial variables, 
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 are the year dummy variables and 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 are the state dummy variables 
I account for the serial correlation with an Arellano and Bond type instrumental regression 
approach, using further temporal lags of capacity, exogenous and instrumental variables to predict 
the temporal lag of capacity. The general equation is 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝜶
𝒙𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝒍 + 𝜶
𝒛𝒁𝒊,𝒕−𝒍 + 𝜹 ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 (𝑿𝒋,𝒕−𝒍) + 𝜶
𝒚𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜶
𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1, 
where 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1is the temporal lag of ethanol capacity of county i at time t-1, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝒍 are the 
exogenous variables of lag l, 𝒁𝒊,𝒕−𝒍 are the instrumental variables of lag l, ∑ 𝑾𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1  are the spatial 
weights matrices of order k, 𝑿𝒋,𝒕−𝒍 are the spatial exogenous variables of lag l, 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 are the year 
dummy variables and 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊 are the state dummy variables 
 
 
(Eq. 3.3) 
(Eq. 3.2) 
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3.3.2 Second Stage 
The equation of interest is the second stage equation. The second stage determines the effect 
ethanol plant capacity has on local corn basis. The predicted capacity from Eq. 3.1, the spatial lags 
of the predicted capacity, the exogenous variables and their spatial weights are included in the 
general second stage equation 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷
𝒙𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝆 ∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒌𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑿𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜷
𝒚𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜷
𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒕 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 are the exogenous variables, including the predicted total capacity, 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑖,𝑡, 𝑿𝒋,𝒕 are 
the spatial exogenous variables, including 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑗,𝑡, 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 are the year dummy variables, 
𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒊 are the month dummy variables, 𝝆 are the coefficients on the spatial variables, 𝜷
𝒙, 𝜷𝒚, 𝜷𝒎 
are the coefficients on 𝑿𝒊,𝒕, 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕, and 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒕 respectively and 𝑾𝒊
𝒌 are the same weights 
matrices used in stage one, where k indicates the order. 
As in the first stage, I account for serial correlation with an Arellano and Bond type 
instrumental regression approach, using further temporal lags of ethanol capacity, exogenous and 
instrumental variables to predict the temporal lag of basis. 
I use the predicted capacity from stage 1 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑖,𝑡) in place of actual capacity to account 
for the simultaneity between local basis and ethanol plant capacity. I also include the spatially 
weighted capacity of surrounding counties because an ethanol plant will purchase corn from areas 
outside the county in which it is located. The weights matrix used in the second stage is the same 
weights matrix I used in the first stage to predict capacity. I do not correct for the incorrect standard 
errors estimated in the second stage that stem from using a predicted variable. This is because the 
R2 value in the first stage is very high, indicating that the correcting factor will be close to 1; a 
(Eq. 3.4) 
 85 
 
value close to 1 means that standard errors estimated in the second stage are close to the true 
estimates (Gujarati 2004). 
3.3.3 Identification Strategy 
Instruments have to be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable being predicted, yet 
not correlated with the dependent variable of the second stage. Therefore, they must be chosen 
with care. To find possible instruments, I first explore literature on what affects ethanol plant 
location decisions. Then I consider how these potential instruments might affect local corn prices. 
I collect data only on the instruments that I am confident do not directly affect corn price. To 
ensure the validity of the chosen instruments, I run three tests. First, I test for weak instruments. If 
the instruments are not strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, estimate results bias 
toward the OLS estimation. I test for weak instruments by examining the covariance between the 
endogenous variable and the instruments 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑍). If 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑍) ≠ 0, the instruments and the 
endogenous variable are correlated. The higher the covariance, the stronger the correlation and the 
better the instrument.  
Next, I test for the presence of endogeneity. If endogeneity does not exist, using two stage 
least squares is inefficient and I should use OLS. I use the Wu-Hausman test to test for the presence 
of endogeneity. To conduct a Wu-Hausman test, I estimate the first stage model as discussed above 
in equation 1, saving the errors 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 to use in the next step. I then estimate a second stage equation 
similar to Eq. 3.4, however I use the actual endogenous variable 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 as opposed to the 
predicted endogenous variable, and I include the estimated error ?̂?𝑖𝑡 from the first stage as an 
independent variable. Using a standard t-test, I test whether the coefficient on the estimated error 
𝛿 is equal to zero. If I reject the null hypothesis (𝛿 ≠ 0), 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are correlated and 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is 
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endogenous. If 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is endogenous, OLS is biased and inefficient and I should use 
instrumental variables.  
The third test I conduct is the Sargan test for overidentification. This test can only be 
performed if there are more instruments than endogenous variables (the coefficients are 
overidentified). To conduct the test, I estimate the full two stage least squares model and obtain 
the residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡 from Eq. 3.4. Then I regress the error term on the instrumental and exogenous 
variables  
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌1𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌2𝑍1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌3𝑍2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 are the estimated residuals from the two stage least squared model, 𝑋21𝑡 is an exogenous 
variable and 𝑍1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑍2𝑖𝑡 are instrumental variables. From this equation I obtain the R-squared 
value 𝑅𝑞
2 and the resulting test statistic 𝑛𝑅𝑞
2, where q is the number of instruments minus the 
number of endogenous variables. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term from the two stage model 𝑛𝑅𝑞
2~χq
2. If this test statistic exceeds the critical 
value, I reject the null hypothesis and at least one of the instruments is not exogenous. 
3.3.4 Robustness Tests 
I conduct multiple robustness checks and sensitivity analyses by slightly altering the method 
I described above. One such check I conduct is to estimate the model without the spatial lags to 
determine how the spatial effects influence results. Because the queen contiguity weights matrix 
determines weights based on whether counties share borders, county size is not accounted for. 
Therefore, I also estimate the model excluding the two states with the largest counties by size, 
Wyoming and Colorado, to determine if county size has an effect on results. The results in Table 
3.1 and Figure 3.5 show that results are robust to county size. I explore the results further by 
(Eq. 3.5) 
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running regressions with one, two, three, four and five spatial lags, separate regressions for each 
region and estimate a regression with year-capacity interactions.10 
 
3.4 Data 
The data I use are monthly, county level data spanning December 2005 through September 
2010. Nineteen states are included in the data set – Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Some counties in the data do not 
contain an ethanol plant; however, since I estimate a spatial model that allows for the effect of 
ethanol plant capacities to spillover to neighboring counties, I include all counties regardless of 
whether or not there is an active ethanol plant in that county. The raw dataset I use contains 
observations at the elevator and ethanol plant level, but for this analysis I aggregated the data up 
to the county level, resulting in nearly 89,000 observations. 
Telvent Data Transmission Network’s (DTN), “My DTN Cash Bids” dataset includes daily 
basis reported in dollars per bushel ($/bu., 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡) constructed from elevators’ spot and nearby 
corn futures prices from the Chicago Board of Trade. I observe 3,341 locations over the 19 states 
from which cash bids are collected, 84 of which are ethanol plants. To aggregate to a monthly 
granularity, I use the basis from the second Tuesday of every month, substituting the following 
Wednesday and then the following Thursday if data are missing. I also average across all locations 
in each county, to obtain one observation per county. Basis statistics for December 2005 and 
                                                 
10 I also run an estimation bootstrapping the standard errors, finding no considerable differences in results. 
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December 2009 can be seen in Table 3.2. I use December 2009 instead of the last month I have 
data, September 2010, in order to align according to seasonality. Basis weakened, or local cash 
price falls relative to futures, in every state. Iowa experienced the smallest change going from an 
average of -$0.23/bu. to -$0.48/bu., a fall of $0.25/bu. Mississippi followed right behind Iowa with 
a change of -$0.27/bu. Arkansas experienced the largest change going from $0.18/bu. to -
$0.44/bu., a change of -$0.62/bu. The Dakotas are not far behind, both falling -$0.54/bu. 
To account for plants in surrounding counties that may affect local capacity decisions in the 
first stage and local basis in the second stage, I include two levels of spatially weighted sums of 
capacities in the surrounding counties in the first stage (∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡 and 
∑ 𝑊𝑖
′𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡), and predicted capacity (∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑗,𝑡 and ∑ 𝑊𝑖
′𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑗,𝑡) in the 
second stage11. I specify a queen’s contiguity weights matrix where the first level (𝑊𝑖) gives a 
positive weight to all counties directly surrounding county i, and a weight of zero to all other 
counties, and 𝑊𝑖
′𝑊𝑖 is a second order queen’s contiguity matrix with a positive weight given to all 
counties in the second order of contiguity from county i and a weight of zero given to all other 
counties (see Figure 3.4). This means that the capacity in each county is weighted by the number 
of counties in the first (or second) order of contiguity, and then those weighted capacities are added 
together. In the second stage I include further spatial lags. The weights matrices are computed in 
OpenGeoDa (Anselin, Syabri and Kho 2006). 
Ethanol plant location, capacity and ownership status come from the Renewable Fuels 
Association, Ethanol Producer Magazine, the American Coalition for Ethanol, and press releases 
                                                 
11 I estimated the regressions using a temporal lag of the spatial lag of capacity in the first stage finding no 
significant difference in results. 
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about plant openings. Seventeen states contain ethanol plants; the two that do not are Arkansas 
and Oklahoma. Of the remaining states, 79 counties contain ethanol plants in December 2005 and 
163 contain plants in September 2010. Of those counties, four contain two ethanol plants in 
December 2005 and 12 contain two ethanol plants in September 2010, for a total of 83 ethanol 
plants in December 2005 and 175 ethanol plants in September 2010. Between December, 2005 
and September, 2010 185 counties experience an increase in ethanol capacity and 19 counties 
experience a decrease. The state with the largest increase in number of ethanol plants and total 
ethanol capacity is Iowa. The total ethanol plant statistics can be seen in Table 3.3. Ethanol 
capacity (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) is measured as the sum of all ethanol plant capacities in county i and month t 
in million gallons per year (MGY). In my estimation I include temporal lags of capacity in the 
county (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) because I assume that capacity decisions in time t are correlated with capacity 
decisions in previous time periods.  
In December 2005, 40 ethanol plants in 37 counties across 9 states were farmer/co-op owned 
accounting for about 36.4% of total capacity in my sample. This increased to 52 plants in 49 
counties across 12 states in September 2010 for a total about 32.9% of total capacity. Farmer 
owned ethanol plant statistics can be seen in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. In 2005, Minnesota, Iowa 
and South Dakota were the top three states in terms of farmer owned capacity with 12, 11 and 8 
plants, respectively. In 2010, Iowa and Minnesota switched rankings and South Dakota remained 
in third place with 17, 12 and 10 plants, respectively. Most counties with co-op plants only have 
one plant in the county, meaning 100% of the ethanol capacity in that county is farmer owned. In 
my data set, there are six counties that have both a co-op and a private plant. South Dakota contains 
two such counties, with the farmer owned capacity in both counties increasing between December 
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2005 and September 2010 compared to total capacity. Iowa also contains two counties that have 
both coop and privately-owned plants, one of which experiences an increase in farmer-owned 
capacity over time while the other stays constant compared to total capacity. Nebraska contains 
one county with mixed ownership where farmer owned capacity stays constant at about 45.6% of 
total capacity. Wisconsin contains one county where farmer owned capacity falls from 100% to 
55% of total capacity, meaning a private plant opened in the county. For further exploration, 
privately owned capacity statistics can be found in Table 3.6. 
I include plant ownership by including the percent of total ethanol capacity in farmer/co-op 
owned plants in county i and time t (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡) to test whether or not ethanol capacity and local 
basis are different for farmer owned plants than for privately owned plants. Though they were 
unable to test their hypothesis, McNew and Griffeth (2005) believe there is a connection between 
farmer ownership and ethanol plant impacts on corn price. O’Brien and Woolverton (2009) agree, 
stating that farmer owners may have to deliver corn to their plant at prices below what the farmer 
may receive if that corn was sold to an alternative market in anticipation of the ethanol plant 
providing financial returns on investment. I expect that the level of farmer owned capacity may 
affect both the total ethanol capacity in a county, as well as the basis. Research from Kenkel and 
Holcomb (2006) and Lin and Thome (2013) find that plant ownership affects capacity and location 
choice so I include farmer ownership in both stages. 
The data suggest differences in the rate of capacity increase and location between farmer 
owned plants and private plants. Figure 3.6 shows that while total ethanol production increased 
every year, between 2005 and 2009 this increase in production was due to increases in both private 
and farmer owned ethanol capacity, but between 2009 and 2010 farmer owned capacity fell and 
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private capacity increased. The change in private capacity was greater than the change in farmer 
capacity, resulting in a net positive change in total capacity. Over the same five years local corn 
prices fell on average compared to the futures price across the map. Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 
represent the relationship between co-op and private ethanol capacities by state for 2005 and 2010, 
respectively. Clearly, different locations are correlated with higher levels of co-op ownership, and 
this location based association seems to change over time. In 2005, Minnesota had the highest 
level of farmer owned capacity with Iowa and South Dakota close behind, and all ethanol capacity 
in Missouri was farmer owned. In 2010, the level of farmer owned production increased in most 
states, with the largest increase happening in Iowa and South Dakota, both of which surpassed 
Minnesota. Missouri’s rate of famer owned ethanol capacity fell from 100% to under 50%.  
Corn production for each county (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑦, where 𝑦 is the year) comes from USDA-
NASS and is measured in millions of bushels. I include one year temporal lags of corn production 
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑦−1) in the first stage because corn is the most important input in producing ethanol 
in the Midwest. It is likely that there is simultaneity between contemporaneous corn and ethanol 
production. However, the prior year’s corn production is unaffected by the level of ethanol 
produced this year. Second, the measure of corn production used is at the annual level, while 
ethanol is measured monthly. This means that up until the harvest is complete, the reported level 
of produced corn for that year is not what is actually available to ethanol producers. For example, 
in March of 2008, the reported level of corn produced in Champaign County, Illinois is the total 
estimated production for the entire year of 2008. However none of that corn had been harvested 
yet. The only corn available to ethanol plants is that which was harvested in the past and stored (or 
corn that has been imported). I include temporally lagged production in the second stage because 
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it is an economic factor in determining corn prices, which is part of basis. I include two spatial 
lags of the temporal lag of corn production (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑦−1) in the first stage and one spatial lag 
in the second stage to account for the effect of corn in the surrounding areas. I tested further spatial 
lags in both stages, finding higher order lags are insignificant. 
I include diesel price per gallon for every month (𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡) in both stages to capture a proxy 
for transportation cost. The theories of supply and demand suggest that the cost of transporting 
corn should affect ethanol supply. Changing transportation costs can also affect the level of 
demand for ethanol. In the second stage, I include transportation cost because local corn basis at 
each location takes into account the cost of transporting the grain to its final destination.  
In much of the corn price literature, the main factors affecting corn price include corn 
production, weather, livestock and other corn supply and demand variables (Sarmiento and Wilson 
2008; Lambert et al. 2008; Haddad, Taylor and Owusu 2010). In the first stage, I include county 
demographics and ethanol production cost factors that are correlated with ethanol production but 
are not directly related to corn price as instrumental variables. The instrumental variables I include 
are population density (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑦), income (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑦), unemployment rate (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡), 
price of natural gas (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠,𝑡), and the contemporaneous and one year lag of the net flow of 
natural gas in the state (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑦 amd 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑦−1). The choice of these variables come from 
previous ethanol plant location research (Sarmiento and Wilson 2008; Lambert et al. 2008) as 
described above. Annual population density (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑦) is measured in people per square mile 
in each county and was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau. Monthly unemployment rate for 
each county (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡) is measured in percentage points and was gathered from the U.S. Bureau 
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of Labor Statistics. Annual county level median income (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑦) is measured in thousand 
dollars and was also gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau. Population density, unemployment 
rate and median income are all county demographic variables. They are part of the attractiveness 
of one location over another to ethanol producers. Many ethanol plants use natural gas in their 
production process, so I include monthly state level natural gas price (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠,𝑡) measured in 
dollars per thousand cubic feet. I include the availability of natural gas through the flow of natural 
gas (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑦) measured annually at the state level in million cubic feet per day and a one year 
temporal lag of net natural gas flow (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑠,𝑦−1). The natural gas information comes from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. I attempted to measure the availability of natural gas in 
each county using the density of natural gas pipelines, however the data proved to be difficult to 
obtain. These instrumental variables may affect other inputs to local basis (corn production levels, 
for example), however they do not directly affect local basis. 
I use yearly dummies (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) to account for changes that happen over time across all 
observations. In both stages I use state dummies (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) to account for different state level 
characteristics like specific tax policies. In the second stage I use monthly dummies (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) to 
account for seasonality in corn production and prices. 
I was unsuccessful in obtaining accurate data on blender locations. Though blender locations 
may be important, the U.S. Department of Energy suggests that blending is mainly done at bulk 
terminals, which are usually located 100 miles or less from the end user (ENTRIX 2010). As 
ethanol is primarily located near feedstock, the blender location is less important than corn 
production.  
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I attempted to include measures of livestock (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑖, 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑖, ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑖 , 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑖) and 
transportation availability, however the measures I include are constant over time and therefore 
are not viable for use in a fixed effects model. In the first stage, livestock captures both competition 
for corn as well as an incentive for ethanol location through demand for dry distiller’s grains 
(DDGs), which are a feed additive in the livestock industry. If ethanol plants locate near livestock 
areas, the cost of shipping this byproduct is smaller than if the plants are further from the livestock. 
In the second stage, I include livestock as a demand factor for corn. I use dairy cattle, beef cattle, 
hogs and chickens because they consume DDGs and corn at different rates. Livestock is measured 
as thousands of heads of livestock at the county level, and comes from the 2002 survey of 
agriculture (USDA-NASS 2004). Ethanol and corn are often moved by rail so I include density of 
rail lines (𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖), in each county as a proxy for transportation availability. I only have the 2010 data 
on density of rail, so this measure is constant over time. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 First Stage 
The focus of this research are the second stage results, therefore I only briefly touch on what 
I found in the first stage. Results from the first stage are found in Table 3.7 and indicate that farmer 
ownership 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is an important factor in the location of ethanol capacity and that spatial 
capacity effects ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑖𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡
̂  are insignificant. The results from the full regression and the 
regression with no spatial effects are very similar indicating that spatial spillover effects are not 
present in the first stage capacity decision. 
 
 95 
 
3.5.2 Second Stage 
Results from the second stage indicate that estimated spatial capacity 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑖,𝑡 significantly 
affects local basis, the effect of spatially lagged estimated capacity ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑖𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝̂ 𝑗,𝑡 decays over 
space and estimated capacity has a larger affect when corn supplies are tight. Further, I find that 
OLS underestimates the effect of ethanol capacity, indicating that one needs to account for the 
endogeneity when estimating the effect of ethanol on corn basis. 
I begin with a simple OLS regression of ethanol capacity on basis, and find that OLS 
underestimates the effect of a change in capacity across all but the fourth spatial lags (see Figure 
3.9 and Table 3.8). The difference between the within county effects is much larger than the 
difference of the third and fourth spatial lags effect. When endogenous ethanol plant location and 
capacity decisions are not taken into account, the estimated effect is almost 0.87 cents smaller per 
100 MGY ethanol capacity within county. That difference drops to about 0.03 cents in the third 
lag and in the fourth spatial lag, the OLS results are about 0.08 cents higher than the full model. 
Furthermore, the Wooldridge test for endogeneity indicates that ethanol capacity is endogenous12. 
The test results are discussed further in the following section. 
McNew and Griffeth (2009) find that a new ethanol plant increases basis by an average of 
12.5 cents per bushel near the ethanol plant. Lewis (2010) finds an ethanol plant increases basis 
by an average increase of 6.7 cents, with effects ranging from 12.97 to 2.21 cents per bushel. I find 
a within county effect of 2.86 cents per bushel from an increase in ethanol capacity of 100MGY. 
This result is within the range of results reported by Lewis (2010) and lower than the average 
                                                 
12 The Wooldridge test results are found using county level fixed effects. 
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results presented by McNew and Griffeth (2009). McNew and Griffeth likely find larger results 
because their research spans earlier years in the ethanol boom period, accounting for the initial 
surge in ethanol demand for corn. Lewis and I include a longer time span, with lower levels of 
competition in the earlier years due to the small number of plants, as well as the beginning of the 
maturing market where growth started to slow. The longer time span encompasses reactions from 
corn suppliers to the initial surge in demand, as well as the smaller increases in demand later in 
the time period when ethanol growth slowed. 
When I take endogeneity into account, the effects from estimated capacity and the spatial 
lags of estimated capacity decrease in magnitude as the distance from the county of interest 
increases. This result can be seen in Figure 3.9 and Table 3.9. When 4 spatial lags are included, a 
100 MGY increase in ethanol capacity increases basis (increases local cash price relative to 
futures) by about 3.7 cents within the same county. A 100 MGY increase in ethanol production in 
the first contiguity of surrounding counties increases basis about 2.8 cents, dropping to increases 
of about 1.6, 0.98 and 0.54 cents as the spatial lag increases. Additionally, the effect decays at a 
deteriorating rate over space. The difference between the third and fourth spatial lag effect is very 
small, and the effects of the fourth and fifth spatial lags are even more similar.  
Ignoring the effect of surrounding counties (both in corn production and in ethanol 
production) leads to an overestimate of the within county effect of a change in ethanol capacity. 
Table 3.8 shows results when spatial lags are not included in the first or second stages. When 
spatial lags are not included, the effect of a 100 MGY increase in ethanol production within the 
county increases basis by about 6.5 cents. This result is about 1.1 cents higher than when one 
spatial lag is included and about 2.8 cents higher than when 4 spatial lags are included.  
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When capacity is broken down by year, capacity in 2008 has the strongest effect on basis. 
This effect is not surprising because not only does the greatest increase in ethanol capacity happen 
over 2008, but corn supplies are also tight over 2007 and 2008. With demand for corn for ethanol 
increasing, and the supply of corn lower than in the previous year, stronger competition for corn 
causes the price of corn to increase. These results can be seen in Figure 3.10 and Table 3.10. 
When I break down the results by region, I find the largest basis effects in the Plains, which 
is home to the highest number of ethanol plants. Ignoring the Southeast, Southwest and Rocky 
Mountain regions (due to the lack of ethanol capacity as can be seen in Figure 3.11 and Table 
3.11), the Plains region has larger basis effect than the Great Lakes region (Figure 3.5 and Table 
3.1). Increasing ethanol capacity in the Plains region by 100 MGY has between 0.9 and 1.9 cents 
more of an effect on basis than the same change in ethanol capacity the Great Lakes region. 
I find no evidence to support McNew and Griffeth’s supposition that there is an association 
between farmer ownership and the effect of ethanol plants on corn price. However, though farmer 
ownership does not seem to have a direct effect on basis, it does affect the level of capacity: greater 
levels of farmer ownership are related to higher levels of ethanol capacity. And, greater ethanol 
capacity is related to higher basis levels. Therefore, as the percent of ethanol capacity owned by 
farmers increase, basis levels should increase as well. If the percent of farmer owned capacity in 
the county of interest increases from 0 to 34.6% ethanol capacity in the county of interest increases 
by about 4.8 MGY and an increase of 4.8 MGY in ethanol capacity within the county of interest 
is associated with an increase of about 0.14 cents/bu in the local basis. 
As the price of diesel 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡 increases, basis falls. A $1/gal decrease in the price of diesel 
is related to an increase of 0.09 cents/bu. in local basis. As the cost of transporting corn increases, 
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the price of corn relative to futures falls. This is the expected result considering that basis mainly 
consists of the transportation and storage costs. As transportation costs increase, the difference 
between local prices and futures should is expected to increase.  
As corn production 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑦−1and the spatial lag of corn production 
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑦−1 increase, the local basis falls, following the rule of supply – as supply 
of corn increases, the price of corn relative to futures decreases.  
I examined the residuals from the second stage for normality, behavior over time and their 
relation to predicted basis. The only concerning behavior I found was odd spikes (both positive 
and negative) in the graph of residuals over time. After investigating further, I found that all spikes 
coincide with high and low basis observations. These graphs can all be seen in the appendix. Taken 
together with the intuition and previous literature supporting the instruments, I stand by the 2SLS 
results. 
3.5.3 Tests of Instruments 
The covariance results show that the instruments are not weak; 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑍) ≠ 0 and the 
covariance on all instruments with exogenous variables can be considered high. Also, the 
covariance between the instruments and basis is very low except for population density. Results 
are in Table 3.12. 
The results of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity indicate that capacity is endogenous. 
The test of the significance of the first stage residuals indicate that the coefficient is not equal to 
zero with a p-value of 0.31. This result indicates that we need to control for endogeneity. Sargan 
test results indicate that one or more instruments are not exogenous or at the least, they are weak. 
This does not make the IV invalid, however. One reason the test may indicate the instruments are 
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not good is that the test is rejecting the use of population density; population density has a non-
zero covariance with basis. I repeated the Sargan test from results obtained excluding population 
density. The regression results and the Sargan test results are very similar. The regression results 
from the second stage can be seen in Table 3.8. The Sargan test indicates that the regression fails 
the overidentification test, suggesting that one or more instruments are either not exogenous or 
weak. 
Another issue with the results provided by the Sargan tests is that I do not correct the standard 
errors of using estimated spatial lags in the first stage or using estimated capacity variables in the 
second stage. In addition to the tests mentioned above, examining the covariance, the Wu-
Hausman test and the Sargan test, I conduct an F test of the instruments in the first stage. The rule 
of thumb is that the if the F statistic is less than 10, the instruments should be considered weak 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). I find an F statistic of 10.17 which indicates the instruments are not 
weak. I also compare the estimated and actual capacity for within the county of interest and in the 
spatial lags, finding that the means are close though the range is larger for the estimated variables 
(see Table 3.13). 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This research focuses on the temporal and spatial factors driving ethanol plant location and 
capacity decisions and how those decisions affect local corn price. I use novel data from a maturing 
ethanol market as well as new modelling techniques to account for the endogeneity of ethanol 
plant locations along with controlling for spatial and temporal effects. I use a two stage method, 
where the first stage employs instrumental variables to predict ethanol capacity. This prediction is 
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then used in the second stage to determine the effect on local corn basis. The research I present, 
along with earlier studies by McNew and Griffeth (2005) and Lewis (2010), provides evidence 
supporting the theoretical assumption that ethanol capacity is associated with higher corn prices. 
Previous studies have looked at the effect of new ethanol plants on local corn price; one of the 
extensions of my research is to also consider an increase in existing ethanol production. I also 
compare the second stage results to an OLS specification, finding that not accounting for 
endogeneity results in an underestimate of the effect of a change in ethanol capacity. 
In general, increasing ethanol production by 100 MGY will lead to an increase of about 4 
cents/bu in the local basis. This affect decays over space. I find that when spatial variables are not 
included, the within county effect of a change in ethanol capacity is overestimated. I also find that 
years when corn supplies were tight, capacity changes have a larger affect, as is evidenced by the 
annual regression results. When results are examined by region, the effect of a change in capacity 
in the Plains (where most ethanol capacity is located) has a larger effect on local basis than one in 
the Great Lakes.  
I find no direct relationship between farmer ownership and capacity’s effect on local basis. 
However, farmer ownership does directly influence ethanol plant capacity to increase compared 
to private ownership and therefore indirectly leads to increases in local basis.  
The location and size of an ethanol plant affects local corn prices. Changes to the RFS, which 
are likely to affect ethanol production, will affect the landscape of local corn prices and farmer 
revenue. For example, an increase of 100MGY in ethanol capacity in a county producing 22.6 
million bushels of corn (the average county level production for Iowa from my dataset) will lead 
to about $904,000 in new revenue in that county. If the 100MGY increase in ethanol capacity 
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happens in the surrounding counties, the estimated 2.8 cents/bu. increase in basis will lead to a 
$632,000 increase in revenue. With possible changes to the landscape of ethanol production on the 
horizon, local policy makers can use these results to inform their decisions. Also, being aware that 
the ethanol plant two counties over is changing its production, and understanding how that change 
will affect their local basis will affect farmer decisions such as about how much acreage of corn to 
plant and whether to expand livestock. Changes in the ethanol industry can ripple through the 
entire economy from changing corn or livestock production all the way through to altering the 
amount of chicken on our weekly menus at home. How those ripples expand depends on the 
underlying choices made at each step, and understanding how a change in the ethanol production 
landscape can affect the local price of corn is a good first step. 
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3.8 Tables 
Table 3.1. Second stage regions and dropping the states with the largest counties13 
 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                                 
13 Results from second stage regressions. Each region was run separately with only the Great Lakes and Plains 
regions producing significant results. The other two regressions include all regions but drop the one (and two) states 
with the largest counties by area, Wyoming and Wyoming and Colorado respectively, to determine if the size of the 
counties has an effect on the results. The results are very close to those reported for the full data set. 
Variable 
Great 
Lakes 
Plains No WY 
No WY or 
CO 
𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.2533*** 
(0.0229) 
0.2435*** 
(0.0192) 
0.1677*** 
(0.0170) 
0.1670*** 
(0.0170) 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒊,𝒕  
(¢/100 MGY) 
2.84* 
(1.21) 
4.01*** 
(0.824) 
3.74*** 
(0.074) 
3.75*** 
(0.736) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟏𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  1.31** 3.25*** 2.81*** 2.74*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  1.08*** 2.09*** 1.54*** 1.45*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  0.67* 1.56*** 0.97*** 0.90*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟒𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  0.36 1.38*** 0.54*** 0.49** 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
-0.0012 
(0.0233) 
-0.0258* 
(0.0149) 
-0.0092 
(0.0137) 
-0.0087 
(0.0136) 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0981*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0030) 
-
0.0864*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0860*** 
(0.0026) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
0.0008 
(0.0012) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 
-
0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0004) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0007** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0005) 
-
0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-0.0095 
(0.0215) 
-0.2985*** 
(0.0168) 
-
0.0912*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0645*** 
(0.0120) 
N 7757 14264 23360 23006 
Within R-squared 0.4852 0.5412 0.4471 0.4460 
rho 0.3769 0.4840 0.5637 0.5898 
Corr (u,xb) 0.1702 -0.0232 -0.2028 -0.2870 
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Table 3.2. Basis (dollars per bushel)14 
 
Counties 
With Basis 
Obs 
Mean Basis  Change 
Minimum 
Basis 
Maximum 
Basis 
 2005 2010 2005 2010  2005 2010 2005 2010 
Total 684 695 -0.18 -0.57 -0.39 -0.67 -1.35 0.36 0.15 
Arkansas 6 6 0.18 -0.44 -0.62 0.10 -0.51 0.29 -0.38 
Colorado 13 13 -0.05 -0.48 -0.43 -0.15 -0.64 0.06 -0.37 
Illinois 82 84 -0.07 -0.49 -0.42 -0.34 -1.17 0.23 -0.29 
Indiana 58 58 -0.08 -0.50 -0.42 -0.31 -0.81 0.19 -0.13 
Iowa 91 90 -0.23 -0.48 -0.25 -0.46 -0.66 0.09 -0.20 
Kansas 87 86 -0.18 -0.56 -0.38 -0.49 -1.05 0.15 -0.15 
Kentucky 17 16 0.09 -0.37 -0.46 -0.07 -0.50 0.19 -0.25 
Michigan 18 21 -0.28 -0.61 -0.33 -0.39 -0.75 -0.10 -0.35 
Minnesota 55 57 -0.34 -0.67 -0.33 -0.67 -1.10 -0.21 -0.33 
Mississippi 1 2 -0.19 -0.46 -0.27 -0.19 -0.60 -0.19 -0.32 
Missouri 46 44 -0.08 -0.49 -0.41 -0.49 -0.83 0.25 -0.15 
Nebraska 63 65 -0.24 -0.58 -0.34 -0.36 -0.85 -0.04 -0.40 
North Dakota 26 27 -0.39 -0.93 -0.54 -0.58 -1.35 -0.26 -0.58 
Ohio 49 43 -0.12 -0.60 -0.48 -0.65 -0.95 0.07 -0.47 
Oklahoma 3 9 0.18 -0.32 -0.50 0.09 -0.55 0.35 0.15 
South Dakota 36 38 -0.32 -0.86 -0.54 -0.47 -1.15 0.16 -0.60 
Tennessee 6 8 0.15 -0.31 -0.46 0.04 -0.50 0.27 -0.8 
Wisconsin 25 26 -0.36 -0.62 -0.26 -0.52 -0.95 -0.16 -0.32 
Wyoming 2 2 -0.22 -0.47 -0.25 -0.22 -0.49 -0.22 -0.45 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 The number of counties in each state in my data in 2005 and 2010 with basis observation, along with the mean,  
the difference in the mean between 2005 and 2010,  and the minimum and maximum of all basis observations in the 
state in 2005 and 2010. 
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Table 3.3. Total ethanol plant capacity, December 2005 and September 201015 
 No. of Counties 
With an 
Ethanol Plant 
Total Mean 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Minimum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Total 79 163 52.7 75.8 1.5 1.5 274 465 
Arkansas 0 0 - - - - - - 
Colorado 1 3 42 40.7 42 40 42 42 
Illinois 5 11 154.8 111.5 40 37 274 290 
Indiana 1 11 102 83 102 40 102 115 
Iowa 18 35 62.9 101.3 5 20 260 465 
Kansas 6 10 20.75 44.4 1.5 1.5 45 110 
Kentucky 1 1 24 33 24 33 24 33 
Michigan 1 5 50 53 50 50 50 57 
Minnesota 14 20 35.2 56.7 18 18 52 225 
Mississippi 0 1 - 54 - 54 - 54 
Missouri 3 6 36.6 43.5 20 20 45 55 
Nebraska 10 23 54.3 76.7 17.5 25 114 300 
North Dakota 2 6 16.8 59.7 10.5 10 23 110 
Ohio 0 7 - 76.9 - 54 - 110 
Oklahoma 0 0 - - - - - - 
South Dakota 10 13 47.5 78.2 9 11 120 220 
Tennessee 1 2 67 91 67 67 67 115 
Wisconsin 5 8 37.6 62.3 4 40 49 130 
Wyoming 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
  
                                                 
15 The number of counties in each state in my data in 2005 and 2010 with an operating ethanol plant, along with the 
mean, minimum and maximum reported capacity of all ethanol plants in the state in 2005 and 2010. 
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Table 3.4. Farmer owned capacity16 
 No. of Counties 
With an 
Ethanol Plant 
Mean Capacity 
(MGY) 
Minimum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Total 37 49 38.8 60 12 18 55 115 
Arkansas 0 0 - - - - - - 
Colorado 0 0 - - - - - - 
Illinois 2 3 44 62.7 40 40 48 100 
Indiana 0 1 - 40 - 40 - 40 
Iowa 9 15 44.2 78.7 25 50 52 115 
Kansas 1 1 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Kentucky 1 1 24 33 24 33 24 33 
Michigan 0 1 - 57 - 57 - 57 
Minnesota 12 12 35.1 43.3 18 18 52 100 
Mississippi 0 0 - - - - - - 
Missouri 3 3 36.6 38.6 20 20 45 50 
Nebraska 1 1 26.5 75 26.5 75 26.5 75 
North Dakota 0 0 - - - - - - 
Ohio 0 1 - 54 - 54 - 54 
Oklahoma 0 0 - - - - - - 
South Dakota 6 8 39.5 69.3 12 20 55 110 
Tennessee 0 0 - - - - - - 
Wisconsin 2 2 48.5 44 48 40 49 48 
Wyoming 0 0 - - - - - - 
 
 
  
                                                 
16 The number of counties in each state in my data in 2005 and 2010 with a farmer co-operative ethanol plant, along 
with the mean, minimum and maximum reported capacity of all co-op plants in the state in 2005 and 2010. 
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Table 3.5. Farmer and private ethanol capacity by year (MGY)17 
Year 
Total 
Capacity 
Change 
Privately 
Owned 
Capacity 
Change 
Farmer 
Owned 
Capacit
y 
Change 
Percent 
Farmer 
Owned 
2005 1156  735  421  36.4 
2006 1620 464 1025 290 595 174 36.7 
2007 1999 379 1345 320 654 59 32.7 
2008 2792 793 1884 539 908 254 32.5 
2009 3536 744 2252 368 1284 376 36.3 
2010 3678 142 2467 245 1211 -73 32.9 
 
 
  
                                                 
17 Annual total ethanol plant capacity, the annual change and the breakdown of private and co-op ethanol plant 
capacity with their associated annual changes as well as the percent of total ethanol capacity in co-op plants. 
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Table 3.6. Privately owned capacity18 
 No. of Counties 
With an 
Ethanol Plant 
Mean Capacity 
(MGY) 
Minimum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Total 42 117 64.9 80.5 1.5 1.5 274 465 
Arkansas 0 0 - - - - - - 
Colorado 1 3 42 40.7 42 40 42 42 
Illinois 3 8 228.7 129.75 139 37 274 290 
Indiana 1 10 102 87.3 102 40 102 115 
Iowa 9 21 81.7 112.7 5 20 260 465 
Kansas 5 9 17.9 45.4 1.5 1.5 45 110 
Kentucky 0 0 - - - - - - 
Michigan 1 4 50 52 50 50 50 55 
Minnesota 2 8 36 76.8 32 35 40 225 
Mississippi 0 1 - 54 - 54 - 54 
Missouri 0 3 - 48.3 - 40 - 55 
Nebraska 9 22 57 76.8 17.5 25 114 300 
North Dakota 2 6 16.8 59.7 10.5 10 23 110 
Ohio 0 6 - 80.7 - 60 - 110 
Oklahoma 0 0 - - - - - - 
South Dakota 4 7 59.5 66 9 11 120 120 
Tennessee 1 2 67 91 67 67 67 115 
Wisconsin 3 6 30.3 68.3 4 41 48 130 
Wyoming 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
  
                                                 
18 The number of counties in each state in my data in 2005 and 2010 with a privately owned ethanol plant, along 
with the mean, minimum and maximum reported capacity of all private plants in the state in 2005 and 2010 
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Table 3.7. First stage full and no space results19 
Variable 
Full  
Specification 
No space No pop 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.7301*** 
(0.0167) 
0.7130*** 
(0.0175) 
0.7166*** 
(0.0175) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   0.0089  0.0121 
∑ 𝑾𝒊𝟐
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   0.0049  0.0067 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
0.1417*** 
(0.0082) 
0.1494*** 
(0.0086) 
0.1478*** 
(0.0086) 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0339 
(0.0371) 
-0.0203 
(0.0369) 
-0.0358 
(0.0378) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
0.0154* 
(0.0076) 
0.0150** 
(0.0048) 
0.0163* 
(0.0077) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏   -0.0062**  0.0378* 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  -0.0036**  -0.0039** 
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒚  
-0.0229 
(0.0139) 
-0.0241 
(0.0142) 
-0.0227 
(0.0141) 
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0367* 
(0.0151) 
-0.0389* 
(0.0153) 
-0.0413** 
(0.0155) 
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0570*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0631*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0595*** 
(0.0113) 
𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚  
-0.0122*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0135*** 
(0.0036) 
 
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕  
-0.0176 
(0.0141) 
-0.0418*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0134 
(0.0143) 
𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒚  
0.0288** 
(0.0096) 
0.0352*** 
(0.0096) 
0.0282** 
(0.0099) 
Yearly Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
2.6716*** 
(0.7429) 
3.7266*** 
(0.06788) 
1.3490* 
(0.6414) 
N 72901 72901 72901 
Within R-squared 0.8565 0.8494 0.8509 
rho 0.7587 0.7790 0.7180 
Corr (u,xb) 0.5515 0.5678 0.7224 
Standard errors are in the parentheses         * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
                                                 
19 Results from the first stage using all data and the full model, not using any spatial variables, and not including 
population density. Population density was examined to determine if population density is interacting with the effect 
of corn production.  
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Table 3.8. Second stage full and OLS results with 4 spatial lags and no spatial variables results20 
Variable Full, 4 lags OLS No space No pop den 
𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.1684*** 
(0.0170) 
0.153*** 
(.0172) 
0.0249 
(0.0206) 
0.1700*** 
(0.0170) 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒊,𝒕  
(¢/100 MGY) 
3.73*** 
(0.74) 
2.86*** 
(0.543) 
6.48*** 
(0.828) 
3.80*** 
(0.754) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟏𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  2.83*** 2.20***  2.86*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  1.55*** 1.23***  1.37*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  0.98*** 0.95***  1.02*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟒𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  0.54*** 0.62***  0.54*** 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
-0.0092 
(0.0137) 
-0.0081 
(0.0136) 
0.0074 
(0.0498) 
-0.0093 
(0.0137) 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0864*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0874*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.1007*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0862*** 
(0.0026) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.0915*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0909*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0719*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0920*** 
(0.0122) 
N 23360 23456 23360 23360 
Within R-squared 0.4474 0.4418 0.3346 0.4482 
rho 0.5645 0.5466 0.5405 0.5647 
Corr (u,xb) -0.2038 -0.1744 -0.2829 -0.2025 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
                                                 
20 Second stage results for the full two stage model using all data, from running the OLS model, dropping all spatial 
variables, and dropping population density. 
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Table 3.9. Second stage varying spatial lags21 
Variable 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags 5 lags 
𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.0986*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0182) 
0.1370*** 
(0.0177) 
0.1684*** 
(0.0170) 
0.2173*** 
(0.0162) 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒊,𝒕  
(¢/100 MGY) 
5.38*** 
(0.765) 
4.72*** 
(0.757) 
4.19*** 
(0.75) 
3.73*** 
(0.74) 
3.56*** 
(0.723) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟏𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕  4.25*** 3.48*** 3.03*** 2.83*** 2.66*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕   2.21*** 1.74*** 1.55*** 1.37*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟑𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕    1.19*** 0.98*** 0.84*** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟒𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕     0.54*** 0.42** 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟓𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑̂ 𝒋,𝒕      0.41** 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
 
-0.0062 
(0.0142) 
-0.0072 
(0.0141) 
-0.0065 
(0.0139) 
-0.0092 
(0.0137) 
-0.0077 
(0.0134) 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
 
-0.0935*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0913*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0864*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0825*** 
(0.0025) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-0.0254* 
(0.0105) 
-0.0640*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0658*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0915*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0934*** 
(0.0125) 
N 23360 23360 23360 23360 23360 
Within R-squared 0.4021 0.4138 0.4295 0.4474 0.4727 
Rho 0.5786 0.5742 0.5707 0.5645 0.5533 
Corr (u,xb) -0.3441 -0.2897 -0.2473 -0.2038 -0.1425 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
                                                 
21 Second stage results from running regressions including increasing spatial lags to determine how capacity over 
space affects local basis. 
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Table 3.10. Second stage year/capacity interactions, four spatial lags22 
Variable Interactions 
 Within W1 W2 W3 W4 
2006* Cap 
2.05 
(2.24) 
1.96* 2.05** 1.55** 1.22* 
2007* Cap 
2.39* 
(0.948) 
2.02*** 1.74*** 1.54*** 1.56*** 
2008* Cap 
3.52*** 
(0.858) 
2.84*** 2.43*** 1.79*** 1.50*** 
2009* Cap 
2.84*** 
(0.764) 
2.50*** 1.66*** 1.10*** 0.84*** 
2010* Cap 
2.83*** 
(0.731) 
2.39*** 1.34*** 1.21*** 0.94*** 
𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.4708*** 
(0.0111) 
    
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
 
-0.0102 
(0.0123) 
    
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0599*** 
(0.0022) 
    
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
 
-0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
    
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0010*** 
(0.0005) 
    
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes     
County Fixed Effects Yes     
2006 
0.184*** 
(0.009) 
    
2007 
0.126*** 
(0.005) 
    
2008 
0.070*** 
(0.004) 
    
2009 
0.038*** 
(0.004) 
    
Constant 
-0.0935*** 
(0.0121) 
    
N 23360     
Within R-squared 0.5606     
rho 0.4788     
Corr (u,xb) 0.0923     
Standard errors are in the parentheses       * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                                 
22 Second stage regression including annual ethanol capacity over space. 
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Table 3.11. Bureau of Economic Analysis regions23 
Region States 
Total Ethanol Capacity 
(100 MGY) 
2005 2010 
Great Lakes IL, IN, MI, OH, WI 1114 3484.8 
Plains 
IA, KS, MN, MO, 
NE, ND, SD 
2910.9 8523.4 
Rocky Mountain CO, WY 47 127 
Southeast AK, KY, MS, TN 91 269 
Southwest OK 0 0 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
23 The region each state in my data belongs to as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the total ethanol 
capacity in each region in 2005 and 2010. 
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Table 3.12. Correlation of regression variables 
 
Average 
Basis 
Tot cap 
Perc. 
own 
Nat gas 
flow 
Nat gas 
price 
Diesel 
Temp 
lag prod 
Pop. 
Den. 
Unemp. 
rate 
income 
Average 
Basis 
1.0          
Tot cap 0.0018 1.0         
Perc 
own 
-0.05 0.34 1.0        
Ng flow 0.39 -0.07 -.20 1.0       
Nat gas 0.17 -0.09 -.02 -0.04 1.0      
Diesel -0.19 0.0002 .00 0.0001 0.35 1.0     
Temp 
lag prod 
-0.07 0.34 .66 -0.12 -0.17 0.004 1.0    
Pop den 0.14 -0.02 -3.98 -0.04 0.05 0.0003 -0.07 1.0   
unemp 0.14 -0.04 -.03 0.37 -0.14 -0.19 -0.16 0.05 1.0  
inc -0.06 0.09 .07 -0.21 -0.06 0.06 0.27 0.28 -0.2 1.0 
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Table 3.13. Comparison of actual and estimated capacity24 
 Actual Capacity Estimated Capacity 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. Max. 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. Max. 
Within 
5.33 
(23.1) 
0 465.0 
5.36 
(18.5) 
-46.4 341.8 
Lag 1 
5.57 
(12.3) 
0 135.3 
5.42 
(10.5) 
-14.2 103.0 
Lag 2 
5.41 
(9.6) 
0 91.1 
5.32 
(8.6) 
-8.8 72.0 
Lag 3 
5.38 
(8.3) 
0 62.5 
5.31 
(7.6) 
-4.6 53.6 
Lag 4 
5.37 
(7.4) 
0 54.6 
5.29 
(6.9) 
-4.4 45.0 
 
  
                                                 
24 Actual mean of total capacity over space compared to the mean of the estimates from the full first stage regression 
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3.9 Figures 
Figure 3.1. 2007 Corn Yields and Ethanol Plant Locations  
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Figure 3.2. Monthly U.S. Corn Price 
 
Source: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/AgriPric//2010s/2010/AgriPric-12-30-
2010.pdf 
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Figure 3.3. Ethanol Plants and Predicted Basis, December 2005 and December 2009  
   
 
 
A:  December, 2005 
B:  December, 2009 
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Figure 3.4. First and Second Order Queen’s Contiguity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
i 
1st contiguity 
2nd contiguity 
j1 
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Figure 3.5. Regional regressions, excluding Wyoming and excluding Wyoming and Colorado25 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 Full Sample results fall within the results found by excluding Wyoming and Wyoming and Colorado. 
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Figure 3.6. Annual Farmer and Private Capacity and Corn Basis 
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Figure 3.7. Farmer and Private Capacity by State, 2005 
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Figure 3.8. Farmer and Private Capacity by State, 2010 
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Figure 3.9. Spatial effects under different lags 
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Figure 3.10. Year/capacity interactions 
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Figure 3.11. Regional Farmer and Private Capacity in 2005 and 2010 
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3.10 Supplemental Tables and Figures 
Table 3.14. First stage regional results26 
Variable Great Lakes Plains Southeast 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.8814*** 
(0.0209) 
0.7438*** 
(0.0218) 
0.9631*** 
(0.0224) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   -0.0015 0.0166 0.0041 
∑ 𝑾𝒊𝟐
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   -0.0274* -0.0228 -0.0066 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
0.0364*** 
(0.0078) 
0.1633*** 
(0.0126) 
 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
0.0146 
(0.0745) 
0.1216 
(0.0866) 
-0.0587** 
(0.0205) 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚−𝟏  
0.0292 
(0.0168) 
0.0317** 
(0.0102) 
0.0118 
(0.0095) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  -0.0025 0.0166 -0.0022 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋,𝒚−𝟏  -0.0022 -0.0388 0.0043* 
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒚  
0.1090* 
(0.0462) 
-0.0547 
(0.0328) 
0.0003 
(0.0069) 
𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒏𝒈𝒔,𝒚−𝟏  
-0.0643 
(0.0478) 
-0.0533 
(0.0325) 
-0.0010 
(0.0076) 
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0148 
(0.0203) 
-0.1055*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0023 
(0.0060) 
𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒚  
-0.0056 
(0.0041) 
-0.0216 
(0.0122) 
-0.0015 
(0.0032) 
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕  
-0.0168 
(0.0237) 
-0.0272 
(0.0319) 
0.0002 
(0.0063) 
𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊,𝒚  
-0.0189 
(0.0203) 
0.0659*** 
(0.0190) 
-0.0024 
(0.0057) 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
3.9914* 
(1.6955) 
5.240** 
(2.020) 
0.5499 
(0.4377) 
N 20240 28235 17112 
Within R-squared 0.8945 0.8636 0.9254 
rho 0.5720 0.7736 0.1762 
Corr (u,xb) 0.6368 0.5328 0.5271 
Standard errors are in the parentheses            * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                                 
26 First stage results from running separate regressions for each region. Only the Great Lakes, the Plains and the 
Southeast regions contained significant results. 
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Table 3.15. First stage annual results27 
 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  
0.8255*** 
(0.0380) 
0.7743*** 
(0.0268) 
0.4133*** 
(0.0209) 
0.5212*** 
(0.0596) 
∑ 𝑾𝒊
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   -0.0167 0.0042 0.0363* 0.0048 
∑ 𝑾𝒊𝟐
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒋,𝒕
̂   0.0371 0.0085 -0.0277 -0.0017 
𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
0.0007 
(0.0130) 
0.1864*** 
(0.0141) 
0.3286*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0001 
(0.0115) 
𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒔,𝒕  
0.2837** 
(0.0957) 
-0.1353* 
(0.0642) 
0.3091*** 
(0.0926) 
-0.2206 
(0.2667) 
𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒔,𝒕  
-0.0401 
(0.0223) 
0.0111 
(0.0246) 
-0.0439** 
(0.0166) 
0.0084 
(0.0214) 
𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒊,𝒕  
0.0243 
(0.0337) 
0.0126 
(0.0410) 
0.0126 
(0.0245) 
-0.0057 
(0.0256) 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-1.2041 
(1.2970) 
0.4587 
(2.2412) 
3.6763* 
(1.7574) 
4.2420* 
(1.9560) 
N 19020 19020 19020 14256 
Within R-squared 0.5700 0.5822 0.5270 0.4349 
rho 0.6361 0.6594 0.9664 0.9777 
Corr (u,xb) 0.6498 0.6478 0.7299 0.9905 
Standard errors are in the parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 First stage results from running separate regressions for each year. 
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Figure 3.12. Normality of residuals 
The normality of the second stage residuals looks appropriate. The tails are non-normal, 
however this is not concerning considering the majority of the data falls within normal range. 
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Figure 3.13. Residuals compared to estimated basis 
The largest range in residuals falls in the middle range of the estimated basis. This is not 
unexpected as most of the basis estimates fall in the middle range and I would expect that with 
higher numbers of estimates, the range in the residuals would increase.  
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Figure 3.14. Residuals over time 
The “spikes” are somewhat concerning, however there seems to be a pattern to them. In the 
next two panels, I compare them to the actual basis values. 
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Figure 3.15. Residuals and actual basis over time. 
When basis over time is under- and overlaid on the residuals over time, the spikes on the 
residual graph line up with the spikes on the basis graph. When the absolute value of basis is large 
compared to average, the residuals are larger than average as well. 
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4. Predicting the Future of the Ethanol Industry Under Uncertainty 
 
Collaborators: Mindy Mallory and Kathy Baylis 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This unique study uses a cross section of data from the Corn Belt in 2010 to predict what the 
landscape of ethanol production might be in the future, given the uncertainty surrounding the RFS. 
I identify non-ethanol producing counties that would be strong ethanol producers in the event of 
expansionary pressure as well as ethanol producing counties that are weak producers in the event 
of a contraction of ethanol demand.  Previous research focuses on what affects plant location 
choice or plant margins, however this is the first study to extrapolate the results to predict where 
ethanol production will increase or decrease. My study uses a conditionally parametric logit model 
to estimate locally weighted coefficients that vary over space to determine the probability of 
ethanol production in each county. In general, I find that regardless of contractionary or 
expansionary pressure, ethanol production will concentrate in the core ethanol producing regions, 
mainly Iowa and Minnesota. 
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4.1 Introduction 
After undergoing a decade of rapid expansion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
proposed that volume requirements for renewable fuels in 2014, 2015, 2016 set in the Renewable 
Fuels Standard (RFS) be revised downward. This revision proposed moving from a 2016 mandate 
of 22.25 billion gallons to 17.4 billion gallons of total renewable fuel, implying the effective corn-
based ethanol mandate of 15 billion gallons be revised downward to 14 billion gallons (EPA 
2015b). The proposed effective ethanol mandate level was about 300 million gallons per year 
(MGY) below the actual rate of ethanol production in 2014 (RFA 2015). In late 2015, the EPA 
announced the final ruling for the RFS volume requirements: 18.11 billion gallons of renewable 
fuels by 2016, with an implied corn ethanol level of 14.5 billion gallons (EPA 2015a). The final 
ruling is lower than the previous statutory volume, but slightly greater than the level proposed in 
June 2015. The uncertainty around ethanol demand experienced in 2015 will be repeated again 
and again since the EPA is required to set RFS volume requirements annually, and is not required 
to finalize them until November 30th of the preceding year. 
The regulatory uncertainty is enhanced by the unknown future market demand for ethanol. 
Growth in the aggregate consumption of gasoline has been sluggish in recent years, which 
contributes to slow growth in domestic demand for ethanol since most retail gasoline contains ten 
percent ethanol. This fuel demand may change in the short- to medium-term as gasoline and diesel 
fuel prices are volatile. If the current low transportation fuel prices persist, the volume of gasoline 
consumed may grow again, increasing the domestic demand for ethanol. Second, the degree to 
which transportation fuel demand translates into ethanol demand is currently constrained by the 
“blend-wall”, a maximum percentage of ethanol that can be blended with gasoline.  How limiting 
 137 
 
this technological constraint will be in the future is in question.  In May of 2015 the USDA 
announced a Biofuel Infrastructure Partnership program to expand the availability and adoption of 
higher blends of ethanol (E-15 and E-85). The ability of this new program to increase domestic 
demand for ethanol is unknown, so it is difficult to anticipate if and how much the current blend-
wall will continue to be a drag on growth in the ethanol industry in the coming years. Both of these 
factors leave us with considerable uncertainty as to whether the ethanol industry will experience 
pressure to expand or contract in the medium-term.  
Research from Blanco and Isenhouer (2010), Ethanol Across America (2006), Dalesio 
(2012) and others show that ethanol production creates jobs, increases tax revenues, and increases 
household income. The loss of ethanol production leads to job loss, which may lead to able 
working families migrating to regions where jobs are available. In this chapter, I examine two 
possible scenarios for the future of ethanol production. First, I explore where new ethanol capacity 
would locate if it experiences expansionary pressure. Second, I explore which geographical areas 
are most vulnerable to a loss of ethanol production if the industry experiences pressure to contract. 
To accomplish this, I use data from 2010 and a conditionally parametric autoregressive logit model 
with locally weighted regression to predict the likelihood of an ethanol plant locating in each 
county.  
Results show that Iowa and Minnesota fare the best: in the industry expansion scenarios new 
ethanol plants are most likely to locate in these states, while in the industry contraction scenarios 
capacity is not likely to be idled in these states. The results also predict that ethanol producing 
counties in Illinois, one of the top five ethanol producing states, are unexpectedly vulnerable to 
loss of ethanol production. In general, counties in the core ethanol producing region remain a 
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strong location choice for future ethanol production, even after accounting for competition from 
surrounding ethanol plants. In contrast, plants on the outer edge of the ethanol producing region 
are most vulnerable to loss of ethanol production. These results provide a cautionary tale for those 
local politicians and investors funding future capacity: while during times of high production, it 
may seem economically viable to build up ethanol capacity in areas outside of the Corn Belt, my 
results show that the most robustly profitable locations are still in the heart of the Corn Belt for 
ethanol production.  
In some locations, ethanol production has already slowed. In 2012 and early 2013, 20 ethanol 
plants across the US ceased production, including plants in Missouri, Minnesota, Indiana, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Wyoming and Kansas (Salter 2013). Most firms that idled ethanol plants t 
between 2010 and 2015 cited high corn prices, low nearby corn availability and/or high 
transportation costs as reasons for reducing production. In 2013, the president of Marquis Energy, 
LLC estimated that as many as 20 ethanol plants would be closing in the future due to tight ethanol 
margins (Parker and Kassai 2013). As of January, 2015 nine ethanol plants across my study region 
were still idle, totaling just over 300MGY in ethanol production. However, three new plants are 
under construction, totaling about 100MGY in capacity. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study of its kind. Previous research focuses only on what 
affects ethanol plant location choice, or determines the break-even corn or ethanol prices for 
ethanol production. In this paper, I determine the possible landscape of ethanol production given 
an uncertain future.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
As with any business, ethanol plants must make a profit to keep producing. When ethanol 
plant margins fall below a given value, the plant either temporarily stops production or closes its 
doors. Previous research into what affects ethanol plant closures in particular, and manufacturing 
plants in general, has focused on input and output prices for the industry as a whole. Research on 
ethanol plant shut down prices have specified differences based on size of the ethanol plant or 
access to distiller’s grains markets. Research into what affects manufacturing plant closures in 
general has examined the effect of age and ownership. 
Schmit, Luo and Tauer (2009) and Gonzalez (2011) find that small ethanol plants (those 
under 25MGY) require a larger gross margin to enter and stay in the market compared to medium 
or large ethanol plants, indicating that in the event of increasing input costs or decreasing output 
prices, larger plants are more likely to open and stay open than smaller plants. These results are 
also found in the manufacturing industry in general with Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) 
reporting that larger manufacturing plants are associated with lower failure rates. 
Sesmero, Perrin and Fulginiti (2012) find that larger plants have been shown to be more 
efficient in ethanol production, using less corn, electricity and natural gas per gallon of ethanol 
produced. The authors go further, stating that access to byproduct markets (namely, livestock 
producers willing to purchase distiller’s grains) is important in determining the resilience of an 
ethanol plant to low output or high input prices. The closer an ethanol plant is to livestock markets, 
the more likely it is to sell milled wet distillers grains, and avoid the additional cost of drying 
needed to ship to customers further away.  
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Tiffany and Eidman (2003) examine factors associated with the financial success of ethanol 
plants, finding that ethanol prices, corn prices, natural gas prices and ethanol yield have large 
impacts on ethanol plant net margins. They also report that the profit of ethanol plants smaller than 
20 MGY is highly reliant on state and federal subsidies. This study was published in 2003, before 
the first RFS standards were finalized and before the unprecedented growth that followed their 
implementation in 2005. However, as of 2013, most of the ethanol plants that have gone idle or 
shut down cite small margins, high corn price, and/or high transportation cost as the leading 
factors. 
Hanson (2013) reports that ethanol efficiency has increased over time, with ethanol yields 
reaching 2.82 gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn in 2010, an increase of 1.43% since 2008. Over 
the same period, corn oil yields increased about 480%, DDG production decreased by 0.5%, 
electricity use decreased by about 2.7%, and water use decreased by about 0.74% per gallon of 
ethanol produced. Though the improvement in water use is slight between 2008 and 2012, when 
compared to 2005, water use decreased by 50%. 
Previous research on ethanol location choice often utilize logit or probit methods, however 
they are unable to account for local competition from ethanol plants, changing temporal 
information, or new information post 2007. Haddad, Taylor and Owusu (2010) use logit regression 
in their study on four Midwest states to determine what drives the more specific (state level) choice 
of ethanol location versus what drives the choice to locate within a larger region. They find that 
regional and state-level choices are affected by corn production, railroad lines, land values, 
population density, livestock, natural gas pipelines and blender locations, however the relative 
importance of each variables differs for each state and for the region. Corn production is the only 
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significant variable when the region is examined as a whole, however in individual state, corn 
production is only significant in states where corn production varies across the state. The other 
variables also are affected by their availability throughout the state.  
Sarmiento and Wilson (2008) also use a discrete choice model, however they also include 
spatial autocorrelation techniques and refine the level of interest to the county level. They include 
the effect of surrounding counties, including spatial competition from surrounding ethanol plants. 
However, the authors measure the independent variables at a single point in time. 
Lambert et al. (2008) use a probit model to examine location choice between 2000 and 2007, 
however they fix the location determinants at their 2000 or pre-2000 level. The authors find that 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have differing effects on ethanol location choice, income 
leads to ethanol investment, and access to corn from within the county and from the surrounding 
counties is significant. They also find that final demand markets for ethanol and DDGs, 
competition from storage or warehousing, labor determinants and navigable waterways and 
railroad miles are significant.  
In summary, past research indicates that corn price and availability, ethanol plant capacity 
and efficiency and access to by-product markets all have a significant impact on the location choice 
and longevity of the plant, however these factors have not all been examined together. This 
research not only combines these factors, but does it in a way that allows me to determine how 
these factors affect each ethanol producing county separately to determine which counties are the 
most likely to host new ethanol production as well as which are vulnerable to a reduction in ethanol 
capacity in each area. 
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4.3 Method 
Using 2010 ethanol plant locations, I estimate the probability of an ethanol plant being in a 
specific county. I then use these probabilities to determine the relative strength of non-ethanol 
producing counties and the relative weakness of ethanol producing counties to determine where 
expansion or contraction in the ethanol industry may occur in the future given a change in ethanol 
demand.  
I compute the probability of an ethanol plant being open in each county using a conditionally 
parametric (CPAR) spatial logit model, a form of locally weighted regression. Using the CPAR 
approach, the local spatial effects are allowed to vary over space, with more weight placed on 
observations close to the “target”, which in the case of this chapter, is the county of interest. This 
method lends itself well to models where the distribution of the dependent variables, as well as the 
effects of the independent variables, are not expected to vary smoothly over space. The CPAR 
approach is also less sensitive to model misspecification than alternate spatial AR models, and 
does not require the specification of large spatial weights matrix (McMillen 2015; McMillen and 
Soppelsa 2015).  
The “conditional” part of the CPAR model stems from the assumption that a set of variables, 
x, is conditional on another set of variables, z, leading to the CPAR function 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖β(zi) + 𝑢𝑖, 
where, in the case of this paper, 𝑧𝑖 are the coordinates of county i, (𝑙𝑜𝑖, 𝑙𝑎𝑖). This leads to the 
equation 
𝑦𝑖 = β(𝑙𝑜𝑖 , 𝑙𝑎𝑖)
′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖. 
 
(Eq. 4.1) 
(Eq. 4.2) 
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The coefficients of the independent variables are found by locally weighted least squares, 
?̂?(𝑙𝑜, 𝑙𝑎) = (∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑥𝑗
′𝑛
𝑗=1 )
−1
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 , 
where w is the weighting function used, x are the independent variables and y is the discrete 
dependent variable. The extension of the general locally weighted maximum likelihood formula 
(Eq. 4.3) into a locally weighted log likelihood function for a standard logit model is 
∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 [𝑦𝑗 ln(𝑃𝑖) + (1 − 𝑦𝑗) ln(1 − 𝑃𝑖)], 
where  
𝑃𝑖 =
exp(𝛽(𝑙𝑜,𝑙𝑎)′𝑥𝑗)
1+exp(𝛽(𝑙𝑜,𝑙𝑎)′𝑥𝑗)
 . 
I use the Tri-Cube weighting function, which is represented by 
70
81
(1 − |𝑧|3)3 ∗ 𝐼(|𝑧| < 1). 
The model contains a set of variables I hypothesize will affect the likelihood of an ethanol 
plant producing. For the model, I first estimate the probability of ethanol capacity locating in each 
county, and then rank the counties based on those probabilities. I then subset the results into two 
categories: counties with existing ethanol production in 2010, and counties with no existing 
ethanol production in 2010. To examine where ethanol plants would locate under an expansion in 
ethanol demand, I focus on the subset of counties that do not have ethanol capacity in 2010. Using 
the probability ranking, I assume the counties ranking highest in probability of an ethanol plant 
are where I predict ethanol will locate under expansionary pressure. To estimate where ethanol 
plant will close under contractionary pressure, I restrict the counties to the 163 counties with 
existing ethanol production in 2010. I assume the counties in this subset that rank the lowest in 
(Eq. 4.3) 
(Eq. 4.4) 
(Eq. 4.5) 
(Eq. 4.6) 
 144 
 
probability of an ethanol plants are those that, according to the model, are the weakest producers 
and most vulnerable to ethanol plant idling.  
Lastly, I discuss model results under two levels of ethanol capacity expansion or reduction. 
The first level is a low level (LL) scenario, where the increase in total demand is simulated to be 
about 300MGY. This capacity level is the difference between actual ethanol production in 2014 
and the 2014 implied mandate level stemming from the revised RFS, as well as the implied ethanol 
mandate from the final RFS. The second is a high level (HL) scenario, about 1,500 MGY. This 
level is just over the total capacity of the 18 counties in the Corn Belt that experiences an idled 
ethanol plant due to economic reasons between 2011 and 201528. When I focus on expansionary 
pressure, I do not know the actual capacity of the hypothetical new ethanol plants. Therefore, I 
assume new ethanol plants have a capacity of 100MGY. This is a feasible level considering that 
average capacity of new ethanol plants built between 2008 and 2010 is over 90 MGY. When I 
focus on contractionary pressure, I use the actual ethanol capacity of the weakest counties. I start 
with the weakest county’s ethanol capacity and add the capacity of the second weakest county, 
and so on, until the total capacities sum up to about the given level (300 MGY or 1,500 MGY) of 
capacity reduction without going over.  
Though we know factors such as corn price and availability, transportation cost, natural gas 
price, size and efficiency of the ethanol plant, access to by-product markets, and co-op ownership 
affect ethanol plant profit, it is difficult to tease out the relative importance of each input in 
determine location choice in each county. By allowing the coefficients to vary over space, the 
effect of each variable is allowed to affect the probability of ethanol production in each county 
                                                 
28 One plant, in Freeborn County, MN, closed due to an explosion and subsequent fire and is not included. 
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separately. For example, corn production may have a large effect on the probability of an ethanol 
plant operating in county i than it does for county j.  
 
4.4 Data 
The data used in this chapter include county level information across the Corn Belt in 2010. 
There are 19 states included in the data set: Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. This research uses a logit choice 
model, and the dependent variable (𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖), was created by coding a “1” for every county that had 
a maximum total ethanol capacity greater than zero in 2010 and a “0” otherwise. The independent 
variables I include are corn production, 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖; corn price, 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖; access to livestock 
markets, 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑖, 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑖, 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑖, and ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑖; and the distance between each county and Will 
County, Illinois 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑊𝐶𝑖 (which contains Joliet, IL). 
Ethanol plant information comes from the Renewable Fuels Association, Ethanol Producer 
Magazine, the American Coalition for Ethanol, and press releases about plant openings. Table 4.1 
shows the number of counties with an ethanol plant, the average plant capacity and the maximum 
and minimum capacities by state in 2010. Seventeen states contain ethanol plants; the two that do 
not are Arkansas and Oklahoma. Of the remaining states, 163 counties contain plants in 2010. Of 
those counties, 13 contain two ethanol plants for a total of 176 ethanol plants in 2010. Iowa 
contains the most ethanol production by both capacity and number of plants. The largest ethanol 
plant is in Iowa as well, though the mean capacity is largest in Illinois. Wyoming, Kentucky and 
Mississippi each contain one ethanol plant at 5 MGY, 33 MGY and 54 MGY respectively.  
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Telvent Data Transmission Network’s (DTN), “My DTN Cash Bids” dataset includes daily 
basis reported in dollars per bushel ($/bu., 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖) constructed from elevators’ spot and nearby 
corn futures prices from the Chicago Board of Trade. Figure 4.1 shows basis across the Corn Belt 
and the location of ethanol plants in December, 2005 and December, 2010. The states in the North, 
the dark orange areas, are the locations where local corn price is lowest compares to the nearby 
futures price and the dark blue states in the South are where the local corn price is highest compared 
to the nearby futures price. In general, all local corn prices fell relative to futures between 2005 
and 2010, and although the basis did not change by the same amount in all locations, the general 
relationship of relatively low prices in the North and relatively high prices in the South remains 
the same. The majority of ethanol plants in 2010 are located in the middle basis range, in the middle 
of the Corn Belt states. 
I include the effect of local corn basis, 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 on ethanol capacity to determine if ethanol 
plants in areas with relatively high corn prices are less likely to host ethanol production than areas 
with relatively low corn price. To avoid possible simultaneous effects of the surge in ethanol 
production in 2008 on basis, I use the average basis from 2006. If basis is a strong factor in ethanol 
location, I expect counties vulnerable to ethanol capacity loss will be concentrated in the regions 
where, historically, local corn price is low relative to futures. For example, plants producing close 
to large demand centers, Chicago, and the Gulf Port for example, where local price is high 
compared to other locations, will most likely to shut down first. One would expect that plants in 
counties with the lowest corn prices historically, will stay open and production will concentrate in 
those areas. 
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County level corn production from 2009, 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖, comes from USDA-NASS. It is 
measured as the average annual production of the county in millions of bushels. Figure 4.2 shows 
the level of corn production by state in 2010 compared to the total ethanol capacity produced in 
that state. Corn production is not the only characteristic ethanol producers are interested in; 
otherwise the order of the top ten ethanol producing states would fall in line with the top ten corn 
producing states. Though there is overlap in the top ten status for most of the states, their order in 
the ranks differ. In terms of ethanol production, the top five states are Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, 
South Dakota and Minnesota. In terms of corn production, those states are Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, 
Indiana and Minnesota. South Dakota is ranked seventh. If corn production was the only factor in 
ethanol location, or even the deciding factor, these rankings would not only be the same but they 
would be the same over time; new ethanol plants would locate where the corn is. Instead, as can 
be seen in Figure 4.3, between 2005 and 2010 more capacity opened in Nebraska than Illinois 
though Illinois produces more corn. South Dakota experienced a greater increase in ethanol 
production than Minnesota, though Minnesota produces more corn. Also, Indiana would have 
more ethanol capacity than South Dakota. 
I include the distance to Joliet, IL as a measure of transport costs for ethanol. Joliet, Illinois 
is a major hub for ethanol storage and distribution in the Midwest, and the further from Joliet, the 
higher the cost to transport finished ethanol to a major distribution point. Though ethanol plants 
tend to locate in areas of high corn production due to the high cost of transporting the major input, 
corn, plants must also be aware of the cost of transporting the final product. Areas of high corn 
production that are also near the major ethanol importer have low costs of transport for both corn 
and ethanol. 
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Sesmero, Perrin and Fulginiti (2012) report that corn availability is not the only factor in 
whether ethanol plants continue operating after start-up. Access to livestock producers willing to 
purchase DDGs has been shown to be important in achieving appropriate margins. The distance to 
livestock producers becomes more important as other costs (transportation, natural gas and corn) 
increase. Locating close to livestock producers willing to purchase milled wet distiller’s grains 
(MWDGs) means plants do not have to incur the cost to dry the distiller’s grain. Even if ethanol 
plants dry the grains, making dry distiller’s grain (DDGs), locating near livestock producers 
reduces the cost of shipping this byproduct compared to if the plants are further from the livestock. 
To look at the effect livestock levels in the region have on the probability of ethanol capacity, I 
include heads of dairy cattle 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑖, beef cattle 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑖, chickens 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑖, and hogs ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑖 within 
the county. County level livestock is measured as thousands of heads of livestock at the county 
level, and comes from the 2002 survey of agriculture I include dairy cattle, beef cattle, hogs and 
chickens separately because they consume distiller’s grains and corn at different rates. Of the states 
included in this research, Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois are major hog producers; Nebraska and 
Kansas are major beef producers; Wisconsin is a major dairy producer, and Mississippi is a major 
chicken producer. 
I also include the density of rail lines in the county, 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖. I calculate the density of rail 
lines by dividing the total mileage of rail lines in the county by the area of the county. Competition 
from surrounding plants is also included in the estimation in this chapter through the estimation of 
the locally weighted regression method (see Eq. 4.3). 
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4.5 Results 
I estimate a CPAR logit model to determine the effects inputs into ethanol plant profit have 
on the relative strength of ethanol production by county in 2010. The mean of coefficient results 
and standard errors can be seen in Table 4.2. Results show that, at the mean, as cash price increases 
relative to futures, it reduces the likelihood of ethanol capacity in a county. Also at the mean, as 
the level of corn production increases, the likelihood of ethanol capacity increases. The availability 
of milk cows as well as the density of rail lines increase the likelihood of ethanol capacity at the 
mean as well. Though the distance of a county from Will County, and the availability of beef cattle, 
hogs and chickens reduce the likelihood of an ethanol plant at their mean levels, this is not the case 
across all counties. The distribution of coefficients over space can be found in the appendix. 
A map of the probability of an ethanol plant locating in each county, broken into quintiles, 
can be found in Figure 4.4, where the lightest shades represent the first quintile – locations with 
the highest probability of ethanol production and the darkest shades represent the lowest quintile 
– locations where ethanol production is unlikely. Also in the map are the locations of ethanol plants 
as of 2010. In examining the map, an overarching story jumps out: the core ethanol producing 
areas in 2010 rank highest in terms of probability of new ethanol capacity.  
Iowa, Eastern South Dakota, Southwest Minnesota, and East Nebraska and Northern Illinois 
all appear to be strong locations for ethanol production. Results are slightly skewed to the West 
with western counties generally ranked higher, and surrounded by higher ranking counties, than 
those in the East. 
To further compare areas identified as strong ethanol producing and those identified as weak 
producers, I create two subsets of data. The first contains only counties that do not have an ethanol 
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plant in 2010. I use this subset to identify which currently non-ethanol producing counties are 
predicted to be strong ethanol producers. The second subset contains all counties that contain an 
ethanol plant in 2010. This subset is used to identify counties that are actually producing ethanol 
but are ranked low in the probability if production.  
The counties identified as strong contenders for ethanol expansion are located in the core 
ethanol producing area, as can be seen in Figure 4.5. Most of the counties identified as strong are 
located in Iowa, though there is already a strong contingent of ethanol production in the state. 
Minnesota, Nebraska and South Dakota contain the other counties identified as strong. Two of the 
top three counties identified as strong in the LL scenario are located in Minnesota, with the third 
locating in Iowa. Of the fifteen states identified as strong on the HL scenario, seven are in Iowa, 
four are in Minnesota, three are in Nebraska and one is in South Dakota. 
The counties identified as most vulnerable to a loss of ethanol are located on the outskirts of 
the core ethanol producing region, mainly to the South, with Iowa, Minnesota and South Dakota 
fairly resilient to loss of ethanol capacity. Research shows that smaller ethanol plants are more 
likely to idle than large plants (Schmit, Luo and Tauer 2009; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989). 
In early August, 2012 five out of the six ethanol plants that idled were relatively small producers. 
Some suggest that if future plants idle, the closures will be concentrated at smaller plants while 
larger ethanol producers only reduce production levels (Doering 2012). For the counties identified 
as weak in this chapter, three of the four counties identified as weak in the LL scenario are 60 
MGY or less. Eighteen of the 23 counties identified as weak in the HL scenario are 60 MGY or 
less and eleven are less than 50 MGY. 
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Nebraska is notable when model results are compared to the locations of actual ethanol plants 
idling, which can be seen in Figure 4.6. Nebraska produces the second highest amount of ethanol, 
behind Iowa. It also contains the highest number of ethanol plants that shut down, though this is 
not predicted by the model results. In fact, the model results indicate that Nebraska contains 
counties identified as highly likely to contain ethanol. The anomaly between the model results and 
actual events is likely in part due to the drought that drastically reduced the 2012 corn harvest in 
the area (Nohr 2013). 
Though the results seem to follow corn production, these results also imply that the corn 
production-ethanol location relationship is not driving all the results either. If corn production was 
the only important factor across the models, more ethanol plants would be identified as “strong” 
in Illinois at the least, as Illinois is the third largest corn producer of the states included in this data 
set. Instead, there are three counties identified as weak. This result also holds for Nebraska. Though 
Nebraska is the second largest corn producer, there are two ethanol producing counties identified 
as weak. 
Figure 4.7 through Figure 4.14 show how the probability of ethanol plant capacity in each 
county compared to the actual level of the independent variable in that county. They give a general 
idea of how ethanol capacity changes with each independent variable. The graphs are not smooth 
because counties with similar levels of the independent variable may be geographically far from 
one another and thus have quite different probabilities of an ethanol plant. For example, Figure 4.7 
shows how the probability of ethanol capacity changes with basis. Though the highest probabilities 
are generally around -0.4 cents/bu, the probability varies quite a bit at that level of basis. The 
general trend tells a compelling story, however. In general, the graph indicates that if ethanol plants 
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locate based on basis alone, the weaker the basis, the greater the likelihood of ethanol capacity. 
However, if you refer to Figure 4.1, the weakest basis locations are in the North West. It is likely 
that factors such as distance from the hub of ethanol distribution in Illinois is interacting with the 
basis, causing locations with the weakest basis to be less desired than a slightly stronger basis 
level, likely closer to Will County. 
Figure 4.8 shows how the probability of ethanol capacity changes with corn production. In 
general, as corn production increases, the probability of ethanol capacity increases as well, though 
the range increases as well. Figure 4.9 shows how the distance from Will County, Illinois affects 
the probability of ethanol capacity. Probability seems to increase slightly up until about 300 miles, 
but drops off quickly at just over 600 miles. 300 miles encompasses most of Iowa, Nebraska and 
South Dakota. Though counterintuitive at first, smaller distances being associated with smaller 
probabilities is likely due to the few plants located in the closer locations like Iowa, Wisconsin, 
Indiana and Michigan, as opposed to those in Iowa, Nebraska and Minnesota. Figure 4.10 shows 
the probability of an ethanol plant by the density of rail lines in a county. Interestingly, probability 
of ethanol capacity is highest between 0 and 0.5 miles of rail lines per square mile. This may be 
because of the distribution of rail density. The range of densities measures from 0 to 2.4 miles per 
square miles, however the mean is about 0.18 miles of rail per square mile and the 3rd quartile is 
only 0.22 miles per square mile. Looking at only those results from between 0 and 0.5, the 
probability of an ethanol plant increases quickly with rail density before dropping off at around 
0.25. Figure 4.11 shows how the probability of ethanol capacity changes with the number of milk 
cows. The results are very skewed toward low numbers of cows. Figure 4.12 shows how the 
probability of ethanol capacity changes with the count of beef cattle. Again, results are skewed 
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toward smaller numbers, however less so than in milk cows. Results indicate that areas with small 
numbers of beef and milk cattle are more likely to have ethanol capacity. Figure 4.13 shows how 
the probability of ethanol capacity changes with the count of hogs in the count. Unlike milk and 
beef cattle, the probability of ethanol increases with the count of hogs. Figure 4.14 shows how the 
probability of ethanol capacity changes with the count of chickens in the county. Though there are 
some spikes, in general, it seems that the count of chickens does not have much to do with the 
probability of ethanol.   
Model results suggest that regardless of the direction ethanol demand takes in the future, 
production should concentrate in the core ethanol producing region, either through plants on the 
edge of the region idling, or new capacity opening in the core region.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this study, I evaluate what the future landscape of the ethanol industry might be under 
both expansionary and contractionary pressure to ethanol production levels. I estimate a 
conditionally parametric logit model to allow the effects of the inputs into ethanol plant profit to 
vary over space. As far as I can tell, this is the first study of its kind, utilizing variables from a 
simple ethanol profit function to determine where new plants will open or where existing plants 
might idle. Previous studies focus on what affects ethanol plant location decisions, or on the 
breakeven price ethanol plants must achieve in order to start or continue producing. By using a 
CPAR locally weighted regression and allowing each input’s affect to change over space, I find 
that the areas currently producing the majority of ethanol are also the areas I predict ethanol 
production will concentrate in, regardless of whether production expands or contracts.  
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In general, the core ethanol producing region, mainly consisting of Iowa, eastern Nebraska, 
and southern Minnesota, is a fairly good choice in terms of new ethanol capacity; those counties 
are ranked highly in predicted ethanol capacity, which suggests most ethanol plants in that region 
are fairly resilient to uncertainty moving forward. The results for Nebraska and Illinois are 
confounded however. My models predict Nebraska as a strong contender in ethanol expansion, but 
it has lost the most ethanol between 2010 and 2015 in terms of number of plants and total capacity. 
Illinois is a major ethanol producer, though results identify three counties as vulnerable to ethanol 
loss.  
Over the past year, there has been a lot of uncertainty surrounding the future of the RFS and 
the blend-wall, and the effects on ethanol production. The mandate started relatively high; worries 
about the blend-wall and inability to meet the statutory mandate were voiced; in early 2015 a 
proposed mandate much lower than the original mandate was published; worry about the reduced 
domestic demand was voiced; the USDA’s a Biofuel Infrastructure Partnership (BIP) program was 
introduced partly in hopes to increase the availability of higher ethanol blend fuels; in late 2015 a 
final RFS ruling was issued, higher than the proposal yet still under the original mandate level.  
If the BIP program results in greater availability of higher ethanol blends, demand for higher 
ethanol blends increases, exports increase and/or the renewed mandate spurs new growth, more 
ethanol plants will likely open. Jobs will be created, household incomes will increase, municipal 
tax revenues will increase, and fewer GHG emissions from vehicles will be emitted. If none of that 
happens, or if negative pressures on the industry arise; input costs increase, export demand falls, 
and/or the RFS is revised to be lower than ethanol produced; ethanol plants will likely close. Jobs 
will be lost, municipal tax revenue will be lost, corn producers in the area will have to find new, 
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or return to old, markets, local price of corn may fall due to less local demand, crops will likely 
have to be shipped further, increasing transportation costs and costs due to lost product. This 
research will improve the ability of ethanol producers, municipalities, ethanol plant owners, corn 
producers and more to understand how individual inputs into ethanol plants profits and ethanol 
plant characteristics may affect the distribution of plants in their area, as well as which factors they 
should be most concerned about. 
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4.8 Tables 
Table 4.1. Total ethanol plant capacity, September 201029 
 No. of Counties 
With an Ethanol 
Plant 
Total Mean 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Minimum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MGY) 
Total 163 75.8 1.5 465 
Arkansas 0 - - - 
Colorado 3 40.7 40 42 
Illinois 11 111.5 37 290 
Indiana 11 83 40 115 
Iowa 35 101.3 20 465 
Kansas 10 44.4 1.5 110 
Kentucky 1 33 33 33 
Michigan 5 53 50 57 
Minnesota 20 56.7 18 225 
Mississippi 1 54 54 54 
Missouri 6 43.5 20 55 
Nebraska 23 76.7 25 300 
North Dakota 6 59.7 10 110 
Ohio 7 76.9 54 110 
Oklahoma 0 - - - 
South Dakota 13 78.2 11 220 
Tennessee 2 91 67 115 
Wisconsin 8 62.3 40 130 
Wyoming 1 5 5 5 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
29 The number of counties in each state in my data in September, 2010 with an operating ethanol plant, along with 
the mean, minimum and maximum reported capacity of all ethanol plants in the state in 2010. 
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Table 4.2. Summary of model results 
Variable 
Coefficients Mean of 
Std. Err. Mean Min. Max. 
𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊  -0.025 -9.18 5.43 1.64 
𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊  (1m bu.) 0.13 -0.012 1.33 0.00002 
𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒘𝒄𝒊 (10 miles) 0.018 -0.073 0.497 0.0013 
𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒊  (100 head) 0.011 -0.162 0.316 0.008 
𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒇𝒊 (100 head) -0.003 -0.06 0.007 0.002 
𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒊 (100 head) -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.0004 
𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒊 (100 head) -0.001 -0.073 0.0001 0.0005 
𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊  1.52 -0.64 7.68 0.35 
Constant -4.87 -29.7 0.92 0.542 
N 1591    
Pseudo-R sq. 0.339    
Log Likelihood -348    
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4.9 Figures 
Figure 4.1. Ethanol Plants and Predicted Basis, December 2005 and December 2010 
   
 
A:  December, 2005 
B:  December, 2009 
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Figure 4.2. Ethanol capacity and corn production by state, 2010 
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Figure 4.3. Change in ethanol capacity 2005 to 2010 and the 2010 level of corn production by 
state 
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Figure 4.4. Probability of ethanol plant capacity locating in each county, ranked by quintile 
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Figure 4.5. Top ranking non-ethanol producing counties and bottom ranking ethanol producing 
counties  
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Figure 4.6. Top ranking non-ethanol producing counties and bottom ranking ethanol producing 
counties and locations of idled ethanol plants 
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Figure 4.7.  Probability of an ethanol plant by 2006 average corn basis 
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Figure 4.8.  Probability of an ethanol plant by corn production 
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Figure 4.9.  Probability of an ethanol plant by distance from Will County 
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Figure 4.10.  Probability of an ethanol plant by density of rail lines 
 
  
 170 
 
Figure 4.11.  Probability of an ethanol plant by number of milk cows30 
 
 
  
                                                 
30 Milk cows are counted in 100 head. 
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Figure 4.12.  Probability of an ethanol plant by heads of beef cattle31 
 
 
  
                                                 
31 Beef cattle are counted in 100 head. 
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Figure 4.13.  Probability of an ethanol plant by number of hogs32 
 
  
                                                 
32 Hogs are counted in 100 head. 
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Figure 4.14.  Probability of an ethanol plant by number of chickens33 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
33 Chickens are counted in 100 chickens. 
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4.10 Supplemental Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 4.15. At risk counties and closed plants 
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Figure 4.16. Ethanol producing counties ranked by predicted weakness and the locations of 
closed plants34 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
34 The first quintile are counties most at risk of ethanol closure and the fifth quintile are those least at risk. 
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Figure 4.17.  Corn production, weak counties and strong counties 
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Figure 4.18.  Coefficients on average 2006 basis 
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Figure 4.19.  Density of coefficients on average basis in 2006 
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Figure 4.20.  Coefficients on Corn Production 
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Figure 4.21.  Density of coefficients on corn production 
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Figure 4.22.  Coefficients on Distance to Will County 
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Figure 4.23.  Density of Coefficients on Distance from Will County 
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Figure 4.24.  Coefficients on rail density 
 
 
 
  
Coefficients on Hogs
-0.031 - -0.018
-0.018 - -0.009
-0.009 - -0.003
-0.003 - -0.0008
-0.0008 - 0.001
Coefficients on Beef Cattle
-0.06 - -0.033
-0.033 - -0.013
-0.013 - -0.0 3
-0.0 3 - 0.001
0.001 - .007
Coefficients on milk cows
-0.162 - - . 6
-0. 6 - .01
0.01 - 0. 46
0.046 - 0.132
0.132 - 0.316
Coefficient on Distance to Will County, IL
-0.073 - -0.019
-0.019 - 0.015
0.015 - 0.077
0.077 - 0.225
0.225 - 0.497
Coefficient on Corn Production
-0.012 - 0.071
0.072 - 0.166
0.167 - 0.312
0.313 - 0.639
0.640 - 1.334
Coefficient on Average 2006 Basis
-9.2 - -4.1
-4.1 - -0.24
-0.24 - 6.3
6.3 - 17.4
17.4 - 32.1
32.1 - 54.3
Probability Ra k
First Quintile
Fifth Quintile
Second Quintile
Third Quintile
Fourth Quintile
Strong Counties
Top 300 MGY
Additional ,200 MGY
Coefficients on chickens
-0.073 - -0.051
-0.051 - -0.029
-0.029 - -0.016
-0.016 - -0.005
-0.005 - 0.0001
Closed Plant!( Closed Plant!(Weak Counties
First 300 MGY
Additional 1,196 MGY
Corn Production
(mill. bu.)
0.001 - 3.25
3.25 - 8.89
8.89 - 17
17 - 27.4
27.4 - 64.3
Ethanol Plant Capacity
$+ 158 - 420
$+ 80 - 157
$+ 1 - 37
$+ 38 - 79
Coefficients on rail density
-0.637 - 0.551
0.551 - 1.58
1.58 - 2.83
2.83 - 4.498
4.498 - 7.68
Top Five Ethanol Producing States
 184 
 
Figure 4.25.  Density of coefficients on rail density 
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Figure 4.26.  Coefficients on milk cows 
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Figure 4.27.  Density of coefficients on milk cows 
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Figure 4.28.  Coefficients on beef cattle 
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Figure 4.29.  Density of coefficients on beef cattle 
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Figure 4.30.  Coefficients on hogs 
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Figure 4.31.  Density of coefficients on hogs 
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Figure 4.32.  Coefficients on chickens 
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Figure 4.33.  Density of coefficients on chickens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
